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The predominant view in the antitrust field has been that private en-
forcement, and especially class action cases, yields little or no positive 
results. On the contrary, they are counterproductive. This prevailing be-
lief was well summarized by J. Thomas Rosch, a former commissioner 
of the Federal Trade Commission, who considered treble damage class 
action cases “almost as scandalous as the price-fixing cartels that are 
generally at issue. . . . [T]he plaintiffs’ lawyers . . . stand to win almost 
regardless of the merits of the case.”1 Professor Daniel Crane has gone so 
far as to claim that “often” in private antitrust class actions “administra-
tive costs swallow the entire recovery.”2 
In light of these widespread beliefs, former Federal Trade Commis-
sion Chairman William E. Kovacic summarized the conventional wis-
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versity of San Francisco School of Law, and member of the Advisory Board of the American Anti-
trust Institute; and Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, and Director, 
American Antitrust Institute. The authors are grateful to the American Antitrust Institute for funding 
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 1. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks to the Antitrust Moderniza-
tion Commission 9–10 (June 8, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/Rosch-
AMC%20Remarks.June8.final.pdf. Similarly, when Steve Newborn, co-head of Weil, Gotshal and 
Manges’ Antitrust/Competition practice, was asked which areas of antitrust need reform, he replied: 
“[c]lass actions: they are increasingly beneficial only to plaintiffs’ law firms and not to consumers.” 
Q&A with Weil Gotshal’s Steven A. Newborn, LAW360 (May 26, 2009), http://competition.law 
360.com/articles/103359. 
 2. Daniel Crane, Optimizing Private Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 683 (2010) [herein-
after Crane, Optimizing]. 
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dom about private enforcement succinctly and correctly: “private rights 
of actions U.S. style are poison.”3 Abbot B. Lipsky, in his testimony be-
fore the Antitrust Modernization Commission, likened private antitrust 
lawsuits to the “Salem Witch trials.”4 Additionally, a European academic 
analogized private antitrust lawsuits to a tort case where a driver alleged-
ly “set the cruise control at 70 mph in his brand new 32-foot Winnebago 
motor home. When the car crashed after he got himself a cup of coffee at 
the back of the vehicle, [the driver] sued Winnebago for not having 
warned him in the manual about the consequences of leaving the drivers 
[sic] seat.”5 
Despite these strongly worded opinions, most of the argument 
about private enforcement of the antitrust laws has been premised on an-
ecdotal, self-serving, and unsubstantiated or insufficiently substantiated 
claims. Indeed, our 2008 study of forty private antitrust cases appears to 
constitute the only systematic effort to gather information about how a 
significant number of private actions have actually proceeded and the 
results they have produced.6 
Our 2008 study attracted widespread attention because it so strong-
ly challenged the conventional wisdom. It influenced the decision of the 
                     
 3. FTC:WATCH No. 708, FTC WATCH 4 (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.ftcwatch.com/series/ 
708/ (quoting William E. Kovacic speaking at an ABA panel on Exemptions and Immunities where 
he summarized the conventional wisdom in the field, but was not necessarily agreeing with it). 
 4. Abbott Lipsky wrote: “[I]t is possible that the treble-damage claims unintentionally assume 
some of the characteristics of a wealth-transfer program that can be gamed to benefit the undeserv-
ing . . . [similar to] other bounty payment mechanisms, including the redistributive and unwise legal 
methods that produced or at least inflamed the Salem Witch Trials . . . .” ABBOTT B. LIPSKY JR., 
PRIVATE DAMAGES REMEDIES: TREBLE DAMAGES, FEE SHIFTING, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 4–5 
(2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Lipsky.pdf. 
 5. See Angela Wigger, Revisiting the European Competition Reform: The Toll of Private Self-
Enforcement 1 (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Political Sci. Dept., Working Paper No. 2004/07, 
2004), available at http://www.fsw.vu.nl/en/Images/Revisiting%20the%20European%20Compet 
ition%20Reform_tcm31-42715.pdf (“[This case is] symbolic for an excessive culture of litigation 
that has run out of control -[sic] a culture of litigation in which ‘accidents’ hardly exist anymore. 
One might wonder how the above examples are related to the recent overhaul of European competi-
tion law. Although there is no immediate reason to assume that the EU moves towards a comparable 
claimant’s culture found in the US, the abolishment of the notification procedure that came along 
with the new competition law enforcement regime of 1 May 2004 raises some concerns that point 
into that direction.”). For additional criticisms of private antitrust enforcement, see Robert H. Lande 
& Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 
U.S.F. L. Rev. 879, 883–89 (2008) [hereinafter Lande & Davis, Benefits]. 
 6. The current article builds upon and incorporates our earlier work. See Lande & Davis, Bene-
fits, supra note 5, at 883–89. For the forty underlying case studies, see Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. 
Davis, Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty Individual Case Studies (Univ. 
of S.F. Law Research Paper No. 2011-22, 2008) [hereinafter Forty Case Studies], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105523; see also Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. 
Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. 
Antitrust Laws, 2011 BYU L. REV. 315 (2011) [hereinafter Comparative Deterrence]. 
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European Commission to seek expanded private rights of action in Eu-
rope7and was considered by the U.S. Congress when it conducted hear-
ings on the “Open Access to Courts Act of 2009.”8 It also was attacked 
by leading lawyers and economists at the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ)9 and by leading academics as well, including the esteemed anti-
trust scholar Professor Daniel Crane of the University of Michigan Law 
School.10 
Given this subject’s importance and controversial nature, we under-
took a supplemental study of twenty additional private antitrust cases.11 
This Article analyzes these twenty cases, compares and contrasts their 
analysis with that of our earlier group of forty cases, and draws new in-
sights from the results of all sixty combined. We have done this so that 
empiricism, rather than conjecture, can inform decision makers about 
how private enforcement actually works in practice.12 
The primary purpose of our new study was to determine whether 
private enforcement provides significant benefits that help further the 
overall goals of the private litigation system: compensating the victims of 
illegal behavior and deterring anticompetitive behavior.13 To assess these 
benefits14 we sought to avoid subjective assessments whenever possible. 
                     
 7. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, MAKING ANTITRUST DAMAGES ACTIONS MORE EFFECTIVE IN THE 
EU: WELFARE IMPACT AND POTENTIAL SCENARIOS FINAL REPORT 56 (2007), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf (citing 
an unpublished version of our study); see also E-mail from Dr. David McFadden, Legal Advisor, 
The Irish Competition Auth., to Joshua P. Davis, Assoc. Dean & Professor of Law, Univ. of S.F. 
Sch. of Law (July 10, 2012) (on file with author) (explaining that our empirical work provided part 
of the basis for the decision of the Irish Competition Authority to switch positions and provide a 
submission to the European Commission welcoming introduction of effective collective private 
redress under European competition law). 
 8. See Open Access to the Courts Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 4115 Before the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (written testimony of Professor Joshua P. Davis), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Davis091216.pdf. 
 9. See Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond & Belinda A. Barnett, Deterrence and Detection 
of Cartels: Using All the Tools and Sanctions, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 207, 227–33 (2011) [hereinafter 
WHB]. 
 10. See DANIEL CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 168–
72 (2011) [hereinafter INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE]; Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2. 
 11. See Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Summaries of Twenty Cases of Successful Private 
Antitrust Enforcement, (Univ. of S.F. Law Research Paper No. 2013-01, 2011) [hereinafter Twenty 
Case Studies], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961669. 
 12. Because almost all of the cases ended in settlements, they were extremely difficult to re-
search. We looked for cases that returned a significant amount of cash to the victims, but we did not 
look for cases that were per se as opposed to rule of reason, that involved direct instead of indirect 
purchasers, that did or did not involve coupons or cy pres grants, etc. For additional information on 
our screening criteria, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 889–91. 
 13. For the compensation and deterrence goals of private antitrust cases, see id. at 881–83. 
 14. It is important to note various limitations on the information analyzed in this Article. We 
attempted to assess some of the benefits from private enforcement, not to perform an overall cost-
benefit analysis. No effort was made to collect a comprehensive or representative sample of cases. 
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As a result, we focused on cases that returned more than $50 million in 
cash to victims.15 We did not include cases that obtained an injunction as 
their only or primary form of relief. Also, because of our desire to ascer-
tain whether the cases produced benefits that could be assessed objec-
tively, we excluded coupons, products, rebates, discounts, etc. Even 
though each of these forms of relief may be extraordinarily valuable, we 
did not count them at all because their benefits can be difficult to meas-
ure.16 
When combined, these two studies demonstrate that private anti-
trust litigation has provided a substantial amount of compensation for 
victims of anticompetitive behavior: at least $33.8 to $35.8 billion.17 The 
combined studies also demonstrate that private antitrust enforcement has 
had an extremely strong deterrent effect. In fact, this research demon-
strates that private enforcement probably deters more anticompetitive 
behavior than even the appropriately acclaimed anti-cartel program of 
the DOJ Antitrust Division.18 
Another purpose of our study was to ascertain the important charac-
teristics of private antitrust cases, many of which could help to influence 
the debate over their efficacy. These characteristics include whether there 
were indicia that the cases had underlying merit, the significance of re-
coveries from foreign violators of U.S. antitrust law, and the size of the 
applicable attorney’s fee awards. Our study also helps address other in-
teresting questions, including the relationship between private and public 
enforcement (do most of the private cases simply follow and mirror pub-
lic enforcement?); the proportion of per se and rule of reason cases (is 
the conventional wisdom correct that private plaintiffs prevail only in per 
                                              
To the contrary, we included a disproportionate number of exceptionally large cases, and this means 
we were disproportionately likely to select class action cases. Moreover, class action settlements 
must receive court approval and are a matter of public record. Often parties insist on confidentiality 
in the non-class action context, making research of non-class action cases much more difficult and, 
for this reason, less likely to appear in this study. Further, we deliberately selected cases that appear 
to have had significant merit that can be measured quantitatively (namely, we selected cases that 
resulted in damages, not just an injunction). For all these reasons it would be inappropriate to gener-
alize from these sixty cases about whether private antitrust actions on the whole tend to be meritori-
ous or that the results that follow are typical of private antitrust cases. For additional qualifications, 
see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 889–91; Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 
345–48. 
 15. We did, however, study five cases in the $30–$50 million dollar range to see whether they 
might be systematically different from the larger cases. See infra Table I. 
 16. In the Tobacco litigation, for example, the result was an apparent transformation in the 
tobacco market spanning numerous years and worth an estimated $484 million. See Twenty Case 
Studies, supra note 11, at 70 n.2. None of that sum was included in the analysis below. 
 17. See infra Part I. This figure is a very conservative evaluation of these compensatory bene-
fits for the reasons stated. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
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se cases?); and the proportion of recoveries by direct purchasers, indirect 
purchasers, and competitors. Many of our new findings cut against con-
ventional wisdom. For example, in the sixty cases, recoveries in rule of 
reason cases predominated, undermining the widely held view that pri-
vate plaintiffs rarely obtain meaningful relief unless they are able to pur-
sue a per se theory of liability. 
Finally, this Article replies to the criticisms of our earlier study of 
private enforcement. We are grateful for the attention our work has re-
ceived from high-ranking DOJ officials and Professor Daniel Crane of 
the University of Michigan Law School. A focused debate holds the 
promise for progress in our understanding. For this reason it is important 
for us to discuss their criticisms concerning our claims about, respective-
ly, deterrence effects and compensation effects. We explain why their 
criticisms are unfounded, and why our earlier study did indeed demon-
strate the truly significant benefits of private antitrust enforcement—a 
conclusion that our new empirical work reported in this Article confirms 
and strengthens. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents the empirical re-
sults and our analysis based on the combined studies of private enforce-
ment cases. Part II summarizes and responds to the criticisms of our em-
pirical research into private antitrust enforcement. Part III briefly con-
cludes. 
I. RESULTS OF THE COMBINED EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
A. Compensation of Victims of Anticompetitive Behavior 
Private antitrust enforcement provides virtually the only compensa-
tion to victims of antitrust violations.19 To be sure, government actors 
have mechanisms by which they can seek relief for victims, but these 
mechanisms are limited and too rarely pursued.20 Thus, it is a great virtue 
of private enforcement if it is able to wrest ill-gotten gains from violators 
of the antitrust laws and return them to those to whom they rightly be-
long. And that is what private enforcement has done. Our empirical work 
reveals that in the sixty cases we studied the total recoveries for the vic-
tims of the anticompetitive activity at issue were $33.8 to $35.8 billion.21 
                     
 19. Since the cases were almost all settlements, “alleged victims” would be a more accurate 
description. 
 20. There also can be restitution actions, see infra Appendix A15, and disgorgement actions by 
the federal enforcers, but they are relatively rare. In addition, state Attorneys General can file parens 
patria actions on behalf of victims in their state. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 884 
n.25. 
 21. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all recoveries, fines, and other figures discussed in this 
Article have been expressed in 2011 dollars. 
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The forty cases in our 2008 study revealed a total recovery of $22.4 
to $24.4 billion.22 Because the study examined only large cases, it was 
possible that this study exhausted the major private cases since 1990, 
when this study began.23 
Our new study of an additional twenty cases, however, casts the 
original study in a new light. The new study reflects $11.4 billion in ad-
ditional recoveries, as Table 1 shows.24 The original finding of $22.4–
$24.4 billion was, then, only a part of the benefits that have arisen from 
private enforcement. We remain unsure how many more important recent 
cases remain unanalyzed, but the total may well be substantial.25 And 
while we make no claims that either the original study or the new study 
reflects a random selection of private antitrust cases, the fact that the 
twenty new cases total roughly half as much as the original forty cases 
could mean the original group of forty cases might not be as anomalous 









                     
 22. See infra Appendix Table A8. 
 23. If so, the first study provided a rough sense of the total amount of money private plaintiffs 
recovered. Also, it may well have captured a highly unusual population of private cases, including 
all of the largest recoveries. 
 24. All of the damages figures analyzed in this Study were generated by ourselves and our 
researchers, and their methodology is reported in Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 889–91. 
The only exception is for the Vitamins cases, where we used the estimates generated by Professor 
John M. Connor, for U.S. private cases only. John M. Connor, The Great Global Vitamins Conspira-
cy: Sanctions and Deterrence 131, tbl.18 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 06-02, 2008) (on 
file with authors), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/~antitrust/node/10119. 
 25. For example, due to a variety of data uncertainties we were not able to include analysis of 
any of the consumer class action suits against Microsoft or the private cases against Microsoft by 
AOL Time Warner, even though a highly respected journalist reported that together these cases 
recovered more than $2 billion for victims of antitrust violations. See Todd Bishop, Microsoft Anti-
trust Payouts, the Grand Total, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (July 7, 2006, 6:50 AM), 
http://blog.seattlepi.com/microsoft/2006/07/07/microsoft-antitrust-payouts-the-grand-total/. 
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Table 1: Actual (in nominal dollars) and Present Value (in 2011 dollars) 
of the Recoveries in the Twenty Newly Studied Private Cases26 
 









1 3M 2006 136 153 
2 Air Cargo 2011 278 278 
3 De Beers 2011 295 295 
4 Electrical Carbon Fiber 2006 
30 34 
5 EPDM  2007 107 117 
6 High Pressure Laminates 2004 
46 55 
7 Intel 2009 1250 1322 
8 MDL v. Hoffman 2008 33 35 
9 Methionine 2002 107 135 
10 MSG 2003 123.4 152 
11 Mylan(Lorazepam & Clorazepate) 2003 
70 86 
12 Novell v.  Microsoft 2004 
536 644 
13 Ortho Biotech 2008 200 211 
14 OSB 2009 120.7 128 
15 Polyester Staple 2008 61 64 
16 Scrap Metal 2006 34.5 39 
17 Tobacco 2005 310 360 
18 Tricor  2009 316 334 
19 Visa MC 2008 6813 7180 
20 Warfarin  2004 44.5 53 
 Total  10909 11675 
 
We emphasize that we made no systematic effort to study the non-
monetary relief that private plaintiffs obtained. We did find some indica-
                     
 26. Present values calculated using CPI Inflation Calculator. CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, 
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). For the formal names and citations 
for the cases listed in our Tables, see Appendix Table A1. 
 27. The year reflects the most recent settlement, if a case involved multiple settlements. 
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tions, however, that sometimes private enforcement can result in signifi-
cant changes in business practice. In the Tobacco litigation, for example, 
the private litigation had a profound impact on how tobacco farmers sell 
tobacco.28 Nonetheless, we took none of these effects into account in as-
signing a monetary value to the private recoveries. 
B. Deterrence Effects of Private Enforcement 
Our earlier study of forty private cases documented between $22 
and $24 billion in cash paid by defendants.29 Although we cannot quanti-
fy how much anticompetitive conduct was deterred by this litigation, we 
can at least place the size of the likely deterrence effects in a comparative 
context. 
In a 2011 article, we demonstrated that these forty private cases 
probably30 deterred more anticompetitive conduct than the entire opera-
tion of the DOJ anti-cartel program during the same period (1990–
2007).31 To arrive at this conclusion, we added the total DOJ sanctions 
(corporate fines, individual fines, and restitution payments) from every 
cartel case that terminated during this period (not just the fines collected 
in the forty cases in our study). We added to this a value or disvalue for 
every year a corporate officer was sentenced to prison or house arrest. 
Treating a year of a prison sentence against an individual employee of a 
corporation as having the same deterrence effect as forcing the corpora-
tion to pay $6 million and a year of a house arrest as equivalent to forc-
ing a corporation to pay $3 million,32 we concluded that the DOJ’s pros-
ecutions resulted in a total of $7.737 billion in deterrence effects. This 
figure, although quite commendable, was only about a third of the deter-
rence effects from these forty private cases ($22 billion to $24 billion).33 
The assumptions we used to undertake this comparison were con-
servative. This conservatism was reflected in the fact that we analyzed 
the deterrence effects from only forty of the many private cases filed dur-
                     
 28. See Twenty Case Studies, supra note 11, at 70. 
 29. See infra Appendix Table A8. 
 30. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 317. We qualified our analysis with the word 
“probably” for many reasons. For example, some of the private actions were follow-ups to DOJ 
enforcement actions, and DOJ fairly should be given some of the credit for the deterrence resulting 
from these private cases. Conversely, DOJ enforcement was helped by the specter of private en-
forcement. For other complexities and qualifications, which apply to the analysis performed in this 
Article as well, see id. at 315. 
 31. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6. 
 32. To simplify calculations, we did not adjust the value of prison or house arrest for inflation. 
We simply used $6 million as the disvalue of a year and $3 million for the disvalue of a year spent 
under house arrest, even if this occurred in 1990. 
 33. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 337–38. For qualifications to this conclusion, 
caveats, and notes, see id. at 345–48. 
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ing this period. Our conservatism was shown also by the equivalent de-
terrence dollar amount ascribed to a year in prison or house arrest—$6 
million and $3 million, respectively—and the decision to ignore the costs 
to defendants of providing injunctive relief,34 products, discounts, or 
coupons as part of settlements.35 Given the disparity between our conclu-
sions about private and DOJ criminal enforcement, however, even a sig-
nificantly more conservative approach would yield the same ultimate 
conclusion. For example, only if prison were disvalued at more than $43 
to $48 million per year on average would the DOJ cases result in more 
deterrence than the forty private cases.36 
Our twenty newly analyzed private cases provide a larger sample 
for analysis. One way to take advantage of this new information is to 
update our original calculations. For example, we have now recorded an 
additional $1.828 billion, valued as of 2011, in recoveries during the pe-
riod from 1990 to 2007. This addition increases the total recovery during 
that period to $24.2–$26.2 billion. This increase means that the DOJ 
breakeven points calculated in the last paragraph—for example, a year in 
prison would have to be valued at $43–$48 million in order for the DOJ 
cases to result in more deterrence—should be increased appropriately.37 
Alternatively, an updated analysis allows us a longer period in 
which we can compare the deterrence effects of private and DOJ cases 
(the original 1990–2007 period now extends through 2011). From 1990 
through 2011, the total of DOJ corporate antitrust fines, individual fines, 
and restitution payments totaled $8.18 billion.38 Valuing each year of 
prison at $6 million and each year of house arrest at $3 million adds an-
other $3.588 billion in total deterrence from DOJ’s anti-cartel cases. 39 
This combined DOJ deterrence totals approximately $11.7 billion. This 
is an extremely impressive figure and no doubt has deterred a substantial 
amount of collusion. The DOJ total is, however, significantly less than 
                     
 34. As noted earlier, injunctive relief secured by these forty cases also was omitted, further 
understating the deterrence value of these cases. However, the effects of injunctive relief secured by 
DOJ cases were also excluded. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 890. 
 35. In defending against either a private suit or a DOJ criminal action, corporations also incur 
legal costs and suffer disruption. Because of this commonality we ignored these factors in our analy-
sis. 
 36. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 340. 
 37. These numbers result from increasing the private recovery in our original analysis by an 
additional $1.828 billion. See id. at 314 & n.89. 
 38. See infra Appendix Table A18. 
 39. Total incarceration for antitrust offenses from 1990 through 2011 was 539.18 years, see 
infra Appendix Table A16, which we value at $6 million per year. This totals $3,235 billion. Other 
confinement totals 117.69 years, see infra Appendix Table A17, which we value at $3 million per 
year. This totals another $353 million. Together, both total $3.588 billion. 
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the $34–$36 billion resulting from the sixty private cases from the same 
period.40 
Even a marked increase in the deterrence value of a prison sentence 
does not alter the result. For example, instead of our assumed disvalue of 
$6 million for a year in prison, one could use an estimated deterrence 
value of $12 million for a year in prison, and $6 million for the deter-
rence effects of a year of house arrest instead of our $3 million assump-
tion.41 Doing this would raise the total estimate of deterrence from the 
DOJ criminal enforcement program from 1990 to 2011 from $11.7 bil-
lion to $15.4 billion—an impressive figure, but one that is still only ap-
proximately half as large as the $34–$36 billion secured by the sixty pri-
vate cases. It would take an extreme revaluation of the value for the de-
terrence effects of the Antitrust Division’s entire anti-cartel program 
from 1990 to 2011 to equal the deterrence effects of the sixty large pri-
vate cases. Only if the deterrence effect of prison was an incredible $40–
$45 million per year on average, and the deterrence effects of house ar-
rest were half this large, would the DOJ anti-cartel program produce as 
much deterrence as these sixty private cases.42 
Thus, the conclusion we arrived at following our comparative anal-
ysis of the forty large antitrust cases has been reinforced: private en-
forcement probably deters more anticompetitive conduct than even the 
venerated DOJ anti-cartel program.43 
C. Indicia of the Merits of the Cases 
The preceding compensation and deterrence analysis implicitly as-
sumes that the cases being studied had merit. After all, compensation is 
only a virtue if those who recover actually are “victims.” If the cases are 
without merit, plaintiffs deserve nothing, and any recoveries under these 
circumstances would be unwarranted and unfair. Similarly, any analysis 
                     
 40. Since some of the private cases were follow-ups to DOJ actions, however, we repeat our 
qualification that some portion of the deterrence from these private actions fairly could be ascribed 
to the initial DOJ investigation, and vice-versa. See supra note 30. 
 41. If we were to use $12 million for the value of a year in prison and $6 million for a year of 
house arrest, the deterrence value of the prison and incarceration would double to $7.186 billion. 
 42. The total corporate fines, individual fines, and restitution from every DOJ case from this 
period together total $8.18 billion. This means that the private total ($34–$36 billion) would have to 
be offset by the public financial total ($8.18 billion) plus the effects of prison and house arrest, 
which means that prison and house arrest would have to offset roughly $26 to $28 billion. 
If 539.18 years of prison were disvalued at $40 to $45 million per year, this would equal $21.56 to 
$24.56 billion. If 117.69 years of house arrest disvalued at half this, $20 to $22.5 million per year, 
this would equal another $2.353 to $2.646 billion. Together these total $24.09 to $26.911 billion. 
Added to the $8.18 billion total for corporate, individual fines and restitution, this equals $32.27 to 
$35.091 billion—roughly the same as the private totals of $34 to $36 billion. 
 43. For caveats and qualifications, see Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 345–48. 
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of the deterrence effects of antitrust sanctions proceeds under the implicit 
or explicit assumption that the cases under examination were valid. Pun-
ishing innocent corporations would do little or nothing to discourage an-
ticompetitive behavior,44 and would, for many reasons, be against the 
public interest. 
As a predicate for this inquiry, a jurisprudential issue warrants 
some attention. It is difficult to develop an objective measure of merit for 
purposes of an empirical analysis. If merit means that in some sense the 
plaintiffs in an antitrust case should prevail, it would seem that a substan-
tive analysis of claims would be necessary to determine whether they are 
meritorious. The study would then require an extensive foray into anti-
trust law, as well as extremely contestable judgments about how contro-
versial areas of doctrine should be interpreted and how factual disputes 
should have been resolved. 
To avoid this quagmire, we rely for present purposes on a legal pos-
itivist understanding of the law—one that relies on prediction, not pre-
scription.45 According to this view, one might say that a claim has merit 
if it stands a substantial probability of success. No inquiry is necessary 
into whether the plaintiff should win.46 
Using this definition, the cases we studied on the whole likely had 
significant merit. First, most of the cases resulted in substantial settle-
ments. The recovery in only a few cases was significantly less than $50 
million, and the smallest was $30 million. It seems unlikely that defend-
ants would pay such large sums merely, for example, to avoid the costs 
of litigation. Only the meaningful prospect of losing litigation could ex-
plain settlements for such large amounts. We are highly skeptical about 
claims that defending these suits often costs innocent firms $10 million 
                     
 44. Indeed, liability for innocent conduct may well undermine deterrence of illegal behavior, as 
liability serves as a deterrent only if it can be avoided by abiding by the law. Random liability—
imposed equally on legal and illegal conduct—would not discourage illegal behavior at all. 
 45. Holmes provided a seminal articulation of this approach, “The prophecies of what the 
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by law.” Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460–61 (1897). For a more philosophically 
sophisticated positivist position—one in part critical of Holmes’s approach—see, e.g., BRIAN 
LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE 59–80 (2007). 
 46. Of course, no litigation system can be perfect. Every system of litigation will result in 
errors. The crucial point for policy purposes is the frequency and severity of these errors. Ideally, we 
would balance errors of over enforcement with errors of under enforcement—a balance of Type I 
errors and Type II errors. Type I errors are cases where courts incorrectly sanction conduct that was 
not anticompetitive. A Type II error is an instance of anticompetitive conduct that is not sanctioned. 
In addition, public policy also should consider A Type III error, which is the transaction costs to 
businesses, enforcers, consumers and decision-makers of implementing a policy, includes the litiga-
tion costs and the effects of risk and uncertainty. For a discussion of the Type I/Type II/Type III 
terminology in an antitrust context, see Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considera-
tions in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1582, 1670 (1983). 
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or more, except in the most unusual cases. Regardless, $50 million 
should be well above the nuisance value of an unmeritorious case. More-
over, the majority of the cases we studied (thirty-six out of sixty) settled 
for more than $100 million.47 Because actions that settle for more than 
$50 million are not nuisance lawsuits, the recoveries almost surely reflect 
the defendants’ perception that they could well lose on the merits at trial 
and on appeal. 
Second, most of the cases we studied were validated in whole or in 
part by methods other than the final settlement in private litigation. For 
the original forty cases, this validation took various forms: 
1. In thirteen of the forty cases (32.5%), defendants or their em-
ployees were subject to criminal penalties, generally through guilty 
pleas; 
2. In twelve of the forty cases (30%), government enforcers ob-
tained a civil recovery, usually in the form of a consent order; 
3. In nine of the forty cases (22.5%), plaintiffs survived or prevailed 
on a motion for summary judgment (or partial summary judgment); 
4. In nine of the forty cases (22.5%), defendants lost at trial in the 
private litigation or in a closely related case; 
5. In at least three out of forty cases (7.5%), plaintiffs survived a 
motion to dismiss.48 
In sum, thirty-four of the original forty cases (85%) had at least one 
indicator that the case was meritorious. Table A2 in the Appendix sum-
marizes this information. Appendix Table A3 lists the specific cases in 
which the merits received each kind of validation. 
We found similar results in our additional twenty cases, although 
we expanded our analysis of the criteria in a couple of ways. The infor-
mation we obtained is as follows: 
1. In five of the twenty cases (25%), defendants or their employees 
were subject to criminal penalties, generally through guilty pleas; 
2. In five of the twenty cases (25%), government enforcers obtained 
a civil recovery, often in the form of a consent order; 
                     
 47. It is difficult for a business to believably claim, in effect: “We are saints who did absolutely 
nothing wrong. Nevertheless, we paid $50 million or $100 million or more just to make the case go 
away.” While we are not asserting this can never happen, this argument loses credibility as the set-
tlements get higher. 
 48. In fact, the percentage of cases in which plaintiffs survived a motion to dismiss may be 
higher. We did not consistently note this aspect of the litigation in the original forty cases we stud-
ied. The percentages appear to total more than 100% because eight of the forty cases involved more 
than one basis for validation. 
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3. In five of the twenty cases (25%), plaintiffs survived or prevailed 
on a motion for summary judgment (or partial summary judgment 
or judgment as a matter of law); 
4. In four of the twenty cases (20%), defendants lost at trial in the 
private litigation or in a closely related case; 
5. In eleven out of twenty cases (55%), plaintiffs survived a motion 
to dismiss;49 
6. In eleven out of twenty cases (55%), a court certified a class for 
purposes of litigation. 
In sum, at least one indicator was present in nineteen out of the twenty 
new cases (95%). Even if one excludes denials of a motion to dismiss 
and certification of a litigation class, fourteen out of twenty (70%) of the 
cases had such indicia. Table A4 in the Appendix explains the basis for 
this validation. 
As to the twenty new cases, we think the higher number—the 95% 
validation rate—is likely the more appropriate measure because our orig-
inal study gave limited attention to motions to dismiss and did not con-
sider class certification at all. But recent legal developments suggested a 
change in approach. As to motions to dismiss, courts have become more 
demanding on plaintiffs.50 Although the current standard for whether a 
complaint states a claim is murky (to say the least), it seems safe to say 
that in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly51 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,52 courts have begun using 
specificity in pleading as a gauge of whether a plaintiff’s claims have 
merit.53 A court order denying a motion to dismiss is therefore a stronger 
indication than it was in the past of the probable validity or seriousness 
of a lawsuit.54 The same is true for class certification. Courts have be-
come more willing to gauge the merits in deciding whether to certify a 
class.55 Indeed, a court may be more exacting regarding proof of the mer-
                     
 49. This does not, of course, mean that the other 50% failed to survive a motion to dismiss. It 
only means that such a motion was not made. 
 50. See Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Of Vulnerable Monopolists: Questionable Innova-
tion in the Standard for Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 355, 356, 369–74 
(2009) [hereinafter Questionable Innovation]; see also Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Antitrust, 
Class Certification, and the Politics of Procedure, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 969, 969, 978–81 (2010) 
[hereinafter Politics of Procedure]. 
 51. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 52. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 53. See Politics of Procedure, supra note 50, at 979. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. at 976–78; see also In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 
2008); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Car Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 
2008). 
1282 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1269 
its at class certification than at summary judgment.56 Certification of a 
class for purposes of litigation therefore has become a strong indication 
that the claims in an action have a substantial evidentiary basis. 
Third, a large number of the opinions among the forty original cas-
es and the twenty new cases contain generous and gratuitous praise for 
the plaintiffs’ counsel handling the case.57 For example, in Judge Nancy 
G. Edmunds’s opinion approving the final settlement in the direct pur-
chaser Cardizem case,58 she awarded class counsel their full request of 
attorney’s fees—30% of the total recovery of $110 million—noting that 
the award was justified by their “excellent performance on behalf of the 
Class in this hotly contested case.”59 Similarly, the Honorable Michael 
M. Mihm, the judge who oversaw the In re High Fructose litigation,60 
repeatedly praised class counsel: 
I’ve said many times during this litigation that you and the attorneys 
who represented the defendants here are as good as it gets. Very 
professional. . . . You’ve always been cutting to the chase and not 
wasting my time or each others’ time or adding to the cost of the lit-
igation. And this was very difficult litigation. . . . Skill and efficien-
cy of the attorneys. As good as it gets. Complexity and duration of 
the litigation. It was very complex. We made some new law on 
more than one occasion. . . .61 
Chief Judge Thomas Hogan in one of the vitamins cases stated in his 
opening remarks to the jury pool: “[T]his is a very challenging and inter-
esting case . . . involving, I think, some of the finest business litigating 
lawyers or litigation-type lawyers in the country that are before you that 
you will have the privilege to listen to.”62 After the jury returned a ver-
dict of $49.5 million in damages for the class plaintiffs, Chief Judge Ho-
gan thanked the jurors for their service and stated: “[T]his is a serious 
                     
 56. See Politics of Procedure, supra note 50, at 969 (noting that courts at times now find facts 
in deciding class certification, something they are permitted to do under the summary judgment 
standard). 
 57. The evaluations of counsels’ work on the original forty cases are from Lande & Davis, 
Benefits, supra note 5, at 903–04. 
 58. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 59. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 508, 537–38 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (granting 
Sherman Act class plaintiffs’ motions for final approval of settlement, attorney’s fees and expenses, 
and incentive awards for named plaintiffs), aff’d, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 60. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 936 F. Supp. 530 (C.D. Ill. 1996). 
 61. Transcript of Record at 45–46, In re High Fructose, 936 F. Supp. 530 (No. 95-1477). He 
accordingly awarded class counsel 25% of the settlement fund in fees, in addition to costs, the pre-
cise amount that class counsel requested. Id. 
 62. Transcript of Record at 25:1–6, In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig. v. BASF AG, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 6869 (D.D.C. Apr. 5, 2004) (No. 1285). 
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case, and you had the pleasure of having very excellent lawyers on both 
sides appear before you.”63 
Attorneys in the new cases earned similar praise. In Air Cargo 
Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation,64 Judge John Gleeson explained 
that plaintiffs’ counsel had won a “hard-fought” battle for benefits for the 
plaintiffs, and the litigation was “irrefutably complex.” The $85 million 
settlement sum was “a result that compares favorably to settlements 
reached in other price-fixing antitrust class actions” and was reasonable 
in light of “the best possible recovery.”65 In noting the “highly experi-
enced” attorneys’ “vigorous” negotiation on behalf of the plaintiffs, 
Judge Gleeson stated, “Settlement Counsel has been consistently com-
mended in the case deservedly so.”66 Judge Diamond, in certifying a liti-
gation class for In re OSB Antitrust Litigation,67 noted that “[t]o date, 
Lead and Co-Lead Counsel have vigorously and capably prosecuted this 
extremely demanding litigation, and I am satisfied they will continue to 
do so.”68 Further, when finally approving the settlement plan Judge Dia-
mond reiterated: “Class counsel have represented their clients with con-
summate skill and efficiency, bringing this massive matter to conclusion 
in less than three years.”69 
                     
 63. Id. at 1520:8–10. There are numerous other examples of complimentary remarks. E.g., In 
re Remeron Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 03-0085(FSH), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27013, at 
*37 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2005) (“The settlement entered with Defendants is a reflection of Class Coun-
sel’s skill and experience.”); In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. 52, 80 (D. Mass. 2005) (The 
court lauded “the exceptional efforts of class counsel” and pointed out that the settlement was “the 
result of a great deal of very fine lawyering on behalf of the parties.”); In re Auto Refinishing Paint 
Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1426, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29162, at *20 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2004) 
(“Plaintiffs’ counsel have repeatedly demonstrated their skill in managing” the litigation.); In re 
Linerboard Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1261, 2004 WL 1221350, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2004) (The 
court made repeated comments to the effect that “the lawyering in the case at every stage was su-
perb.”); Final Approval Hearing Transcript at 34:2–3, In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 
363 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Let me say that the lawyers in this case have done a stupendous job.”). Cali-
fornia Attorney General Bill Lockyer praised private counsel in El Paso, noting they “were well 
financed and expert litigators, bringing particular credibility to the [settlement] negotiations,” and 
stating, “Class counsel were crucial to bringing [the settlement] to fruition.” Forty Case Studies, 
supra note 6, at 87 (El Paso case summary). 
 64. In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1775, 2011 WL 2909162, at 
*4 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2011). 
 65. In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1775, 2009 WL 3077396, at 
*9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2009) (Judge Gleeson’s memorandum and order approving Lufthansa settle-
ment). 
 66. Id. at *28. 
 67. In re OSB Antitrust Litig., No. 06-826, 2007 WL 2253419 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2007). 
 68. Id. at *5. 
 69. Final Approval Order at 5, In re OSB Antitrust Litig., No. 06-826, 2007 WL 2253419 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2007), available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/ospfeeallocationorder.pdf. 
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Finally, in the tobacco litigation, DeLoach v. Philip Morris Cos.,70 
Judge Osteen had high praise for Class Counsel: “Plaintiffs’ Co-Lead 
Counsel . . . faced the daunting task of litigating against an industry that 
is one of the most ardently protective of its rights and well-represented in 
the nation with no guarantee that their investments of time and effort 
would be repaid.”71 Judge Osteen also highlighted that “[t]his settlement 
was the first class action antitrust settlement (and the largest class action 
settlement of any kind) by these Defendants”72 and “the fact there were 
no objections to the settlement and only 161 timely opt-outs testifies to 
the value of the settlement in the eyes of the class.”73 Judge Osteen re-
served special praise for the efforts of the plaintiffs’ attorneys: 
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ Co-Lead Counsel reached this result without 
the benefit of assistance from numerous other law firms. In many 
similar cases, numerous law firms join the case by filing related ac-
tions that are eventually consolidated into a single case. The fact 
that no additional firms joined this case may show that the legal 
community thought this case against these defendants was untena-
ble. It also reinforces the value of the settlement achieved for the 
class given that Plaintiffs’ Co-Lead Counsel were not assisted by so 
great a number of additional lawyers.74 
Contrary to what some might expect, party affiliation does not indi-
cate the likelihood of judicial praise for private antitrust attorneys. As to 
the original forty cases, of the eight judges from whom we were able to 
discover explicit and generous praise for the conduct of plaintiffs’ attor-
neys (in none of the cases did we discover criticism), five were appointed 
by a Republican president.75 Similarly, two of the three judges who 
praised plaintiffs’ counsel’s efforts in the new studies were appointed by 
Republicans (again, we found no criticisms). 
More generally, the party affiliation of the judges who presided 
over the cases we studied perhaps provides a fourth and final reason to 
believe that those cases were generally meritorious. The judges were ap-
pointed by both Republican and Democratic presidents. This fact has 
significance for various reasons. If the judges in the cases we studied 
somehow were all ideologically aligned with plaintiffs’ attorneys, their 
praise for the attorneys’ work would not mean as much. One could also 
suspect—although the suspicion would be implausible—that the cases 
                     
 70. No. 1:00-CV-1235, 2003 WL 5508762 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 19, 2003). 
 71. Id. at *10. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 903–04 & tbl.10. 
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succeeded only because of overly sympathetic judges. In other words, 
judicial ideology rather than the merits might explain the relief private 
plaintiffs obtained. 
Further, even though almost all of the forty cases were settlements, 
a federal judge approved all of the class action settlements as fair, rea-
sonable, and adequate. While this certainly is not the same as a verdict, 
this approval by a diverse and generally conservative76 group of federal 
judges has some significance.77 We note that of the forty-five federal 
judges who presided over part or all of the cases we studied, twenty-
seven were appointed by a Republican president.78 We also note that this 
litigation occurred during an era when almost every Supreme Court anti-
trust decision has been decided in favor of the defendant. Fifteen of the 
last sixteen antitrust decisions, by a Court rated by Judge Posner as the 
most conservative since 1930,79 including every case except one80 decid-
ed after 1992, ruled against plaintiffs.81 Since this tide of pro-defendant 
instruction effectively tells the lower courts how to decide close cases, 
and given the high percentage of Republican-appointed judges presiding 
in the litigation we studied, one would not expect praise of the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ work, undue fear by defendants and their counsel of a biased 
                     
 76. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical 
Study 6–7, 18, 46 tbl. 3 (U. Chi. L. & Econ., Online Working Paper No. 404, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1126403. They conclude that the current Su-
preme Court is the most conservative since at least 1930. 
 77. We do not mean to put undue weight on this point. Judges are supposed to protect class 
members—not defendants—in approving class action settlements. So a judge’s approval of a class 
action settlement does not necessarily mean it was meritorious. Indeed, just about any settlement 
should warrant approval if a class action lacks any merit. Still, judges can make settlement difficult 
if they believe plaintiffs have pursued a class action with no basis in law or evidence. 
 78. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, tbl.10. 
 79. See Landes & Posner, supra note 76. 
 80. See Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust Book Ends: The 2006 Supreme Court Term in Historical 
Context, 22 ANTITRUST 21, 22 (Fall 2007). After Professor Gavil published his article the American 
Needle case was decided for plaintiff. American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 
2201 (2010). 
 81. Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009) (9–0 in the judg-
ment, 5–4 in regard to the Court’s opinion); Leegin Creative Leather Prods. Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 
U.S. 877 (2007) (5–4 decision); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007) (7–1 
decision); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (7–2 decision); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. 
Ross-Simmons Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007) (9–0 decision); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, 
Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (8–0 decision); Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) (8–0 decision); 
Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006) (7–2 decision); F. 
Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (8–0 decision); U.S. Postal Serv. v. 
Flamingo Indus. (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736 (2004) (9–0 decision); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (9–0 decision); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 
526 U.S. 756 (1998); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
522 U.S. 3 (1997); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); see Gavil, supra note 80, at 22 
(“The last clear plaintiffs’ victories in the Court occurred in 1992 in two cases, [Eastman Kodak Co. 
v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992)] and [FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621 (1992)].”). 
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judge, or approval of the class action settlements based on any pre-
existing excessive judicial sympathy for plaintiffs’ attorneys.82 
Each of these reasons is evidence, but not proof, that these private 
antitrust cases involved anticompetitive behavior. Ultimately, there is no 
obvious way to prove or fully refute assertions that many or most private 
cases are unmeritorious and are tantamount to extortion. We submit, 
however, that the above analysis should at a minimum give rise to a pre-
sumption—perhaps even a strong presumption—that the cases involved 
legitimate claims. There is no evidence, moreover, to believe the oppo-
site. 
D. Recoveries by Direct Purchasers, Indirect Purchasers,  
and Competitors 
An interesting shift between the original study and the new study 
concerns the kind of plaintiff pursuing the litigation. In the original 
study, direct purchaser actions predominated. Thirty-two of the forty 
cases involved direct purchasers, six involved indirect purchasers, and 
six involved competitors. Direct purchasers recovered between $12 bil-
lion and $13.5 billion compared to $1.8 billion for indirect purchasers 
and between $4 billion and $4.3 billion for competitors.83 
The complexion of the new study is different. As shown in Table 2 
below, eleven of the twenty new cases involved direct purchasers, four 
involved indirect purchasers, six involved competitors, and two involved 
sellers. While the number of cases involving direct purchasers remained 
dominant, the margin has narrowed. But in the new study the recoveries 
in the competitor cases total almost $9 billion, whereas the direct pur-
chasers recovered cumulatively less than $1 billion, the indirect purchas-
ers recovered $150 million, and the sellers (a new category of plaintiffs) 





                     
 82. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, tbl.10. We do not mean to suggest that judges 
act on crass political commitments in presiding over litigation or that party affiliation correlates 
perfectly with attitudes toward plaintiffs in class actions. Our point is that our analysis is supported 
to the extent party affiliation might serve as an extremely crude and rough check on whether the 
judges in the cases we studied were unduly sympathetic to class counsel’s efforts. 
 83. Id. at 899–900. These numbers add to more than forty because a single case can involve 
more than one kind of plaintiff. 
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Table 2: Recoveries by Category of Plaintiff ($s million) 
 





3M 67.6  68.5  
Air Cargo 278    
De Beers 22.5 272.5   
Electrical  
Carbon Fiber 
30    
EPDM 112    
High Pressure 
Laminates 
41 5.2   
Intel   1250  
MDL 33    
Methionine 107    
MSG 123.4    
Mylan 35 35   
Novell   536  
OrthoBiotech   200  
Polyester  
Staple 
61    
Scrap Metal    34.5 
Tobacco    310 
Tricor 250 65.7   
Visa MC   6813  
Warfarin  44.5   
     
Total 1,161 378 8944 344.5 
 
It is difficult to know whether the original study, the new study, or 
a combination of the two is more likely to be representative of private 
actions as a whole. Perhaps the two large competitor cases in the new 
study—Intel84 and, especially, Visa/MasterCard85—distorted our new 
findings as to the amount of recoveries that went to the different types of 
plaintiffs. Alternatively, perhaps cases like Intel and Visa/MasterCard 
help to correct for the bias in our analysis toward class actions, which are 
easier to analyze because they are a matter of public record. In any case, 
taking the two studies together, direct purchasers and competitors recov-
                     
 84. In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 05-1717-JJF, 2005 WL 
1838069 (D. Del. 2007). 
 85. See infra note 151. 
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ered about equal amounts, even though direct purchasers participated in 
forty-three of the sixty cases and competitors in only twelve. 
E. Recoveries from Foreign Violators of U.S. Law 
In addition to the total amount of recovery gained through private 
enforcement of the antitrust laws, it is also of significance to note whom 
the awards were recovered against. Not only is the total recovery of more 
than $30 billion significant, but so is the fact that a substantial portion of 
the recoveries came from foreign lawbreakers. Without private enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws, these foreign actors could have preyed on par-
ticipants in the U.S. economy and retained almost all of their spoils.86 
In regard to recoveries from foreign entities, the two studies reflect 
an interesting disparity. In the first study, a much larger proportion of the 
overall recovery came from foreign corporations. In the original forty 
cases, an amount between $5.7 and $7 billion of the total of $18 to $19.6 
billion (not adjusting for inflation) was recovered from foreign corpora-
tions. In other words, about one-third of the recoveries were by victims 
of foreign violators of the antitrust laws. In the twenty additional cases, 
we were able to identify with confidence only $394 million that was re-
covered from foreign actors, as indicated in Appendix Table A4. An ad-
ditional $591 million was recovered from corporate families that include 
both foreign and U.S. entities, but we could not determine the source of 
recovery, as shown in Appendix Table A5. In the new study, then, in to-
tal only $394 to $985 million—between 4% and 9%—was recovered 
from foreign actors. 
This disparity can perhaps be explained in various ways. First, it 
may be possible that the huge Vitamins antitrust litigation skewed our 
initial analysis. That case by itself was responsible for $3.9 billion to 
$5.3 billion in recovery from foreign actors. Second, the Vi-
sa/MasterCard antitrust case—which did not involve foreign actors—
may have distorted the results of our new study in the opposite direction. 
It accounted for almost $7 billion of the total of slightly over $11 billion 
in recoveries we evaluated. Third, the additional twenty cases involve on 
the whole more recent litigation, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act in F. Hoffmann-La 
Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.87 and the reading of that opinion by some 
lower courts may have increased the difficulty for U.S. plaintiffs to re-
                     
 86. Foreign lawbreakers might also have returned some of their overcharges through DOJ 
restitution actions, FTC disgorgement actions, or state parens patria actions. See generally supra 
note 20. Although we have not attempted to ascertain the amounts involved, we believe they are 
likely to be small compared to the amounts recovered in private cases. 
 87. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
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cover from foreign actors.88 The consequence may be that U.S. victims 
of foreign anticompetitive behavior are having a progressively more dif-
ficult time prevailing in court. 
F. Per Se, Rule of Reason, and Mixed Cases 
An interesting and surprising result from the new study—one that 
finds significant confirmation in the first study—is that a substantial por-
tion of private recoveries occurred in cases subject to the rule of reason, 
as well as in cases in which it was unclear whether the rule of reason or a 
per se rule would apply. In the new study, over $9 billion was recovered 
in rule of reason cases, $619 million in pure per se cases, and $580 mil-
lion in mixed cases. These numbers are reflected below in Tables 3, 4, 
and 5. In other words, the vast majority of the recovery was in rule of 
reason cases. Even if one eliminates the potentially distorting effect of 
the huge Visa/MasterCard antitrust litigation—a rule of reason case—the 
total recovery in rule of reason cases remains $2 billion, more than triple 
the recovery in either pure per se cases or mixed cases and larger than 
those two categories combined. 
Table 3: Recoveries in Rule of Reason Cases 




Lorazepam & Clorazepate 
(Mylan) 
70 
Novell v. Microsoft 536 
Tricor 316 







                     
 88. But see Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (revers-
ing a panel opinion reading the FTAIA to restrict lawsuits in the United States). 
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Table 4: Recoveries in Per Se Cases 
Case Recovery ($s Millions) 
Air Cargo 278 
De Beers 295 
Electrical Carbon Fiber 30 
EPDM 107 




Polyester Staple 61 
Scrap Metal 34.5 
  
Total 1203 
Table 5: Recoveries in Mixed Cases (Mix of Per Se and Rule of Reason) 
Case Recovery ($s Millions) 
Ortho Biotech 200 
Tobacco 310 
  
Total  510 
 
The first study involved a higher, but not overwhelming, proportion 
of per se cases: somewhat over $8 billion in recovery in rule of reason 
cases, somewhat over $9–$10 billion in pure per se cases and somewhat 
over a billion and a half dollars in mixed cases.89 The split, then, was 
almost even between pure per se cases and those that involved the rule of 
reason, and slightly less than half the recoveries came in cases involving 
only the rule of reason. 
Combining the two studies, we find that pure rule of reason cases 
predominated. Over $17 billion of the more than $30 billion in total re-
coveries came in rule of reason cases, and over $2 billion came in mixed 
cases, leaving only about $10 billion—or a third of the total—in pure per 
se cases. 
These outcomes upset the standard view. A commonly held under-
standing is that rule of reason cases so rarely succeed that they are not 
worth bringing. Consider the empirical work of Professor Michael Carri-
er. In 2009, he analyzed every final judgment in federal court involving a 
rule of reason claim that he could find from February 2, 1999, to May 5, 
                     
 89. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 912–14. 
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2009.90 He concluded that defendants won 221 of 222 cases.91 Among 
his other interesting conclusions was that “plaintiffs almost never win 
under the rule of reason.”92 
A difficulty for his study in this regard, however, is that he ana-
lyzed only judicial rulings producing final judgments. Most cases settle 
before a final judgment. Moreover, judicial rulings are likely to result in 
final judgments in cases where defendants win. A court can enter a final 
judgment if it grants a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in a 
defendant’s favor. But if it denies such a motion, ruling for a plaintiff, 
the litigation simply continues, often leading to settlement rather than 
trial. Indeed, as Professor Carrier acknowledged, “Nearly all of 
the . . . cases [he analyzed] involve[d] courts’ grants of summary judg-
ment and motions to dismiss.”93 
Professor Carrier’s study would capture success by plaintiffs only if 
they won at trial or in the unlikely event they obtained a favorable final 
judgment by motion for judgment on the pleadings, motion for summary 
judgment, or the like. Moreover, Carrier considered final judgments after 
trial only if the rule of reason analysis was conducted by a judge, not a 
jury.94 Given that plaintiffs have a right to try antitrust cases for damages 
before juries, it is unsurprising that Professor Carrier found only one case 
in which plaintiffs prevailed. His methodology would be expected to 
eliminate almost every manner in which plaintiffs would be expected to 
win.95 
Due to these methodological problems, Professor Carrier’s conclu-
sion that plaintiffs almost always lose rule of reason cases does not nec-
essarily follow from his analysis. In a significant proportion of rule of 
reason cases, plaintiffs may survive far enough into litigation to obtain 
settlements, perhaps even substantial settlements. But without further 
empirical inquiry, that possibility would be just a matter of theory. The 
cases Professor Carrier eliminated could resemble the cases he analyzed. 
                     
 90. Michael Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 827, 828–29 (2009). 
 91. Id. at 830. 
 92. Id. We discuss only this finding, even though his analysis also addressed other interesting 
issues regarding which he reached valuable conclusions. 
 93. Id. at 829. 
 94. Carrier took this approach because the focus of his interest was on the structure of rule of 
reason analysis. Id. at 827. Note that if judges reason in a systematically different way when they 
rule in favor of plaintiffs rather than defendants, Carrier’s exclusive focus on final judgments may 
also undermine his conclusions about the structure of the rule of reason analysis in federal court. We 
mean to express no view, however, on this issue. 
 95. Professor Carrier did not, however, eliminate every possible way, as is demonstrated by the 
bench trial and appeal in United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003), the one loss 
by defendants that Carrier identified. See Carrier, supra note 90, at 831. 
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Our empirical work provides evidentiary support for the proposition 
that plaintiffs succeed more often in rule of reason cases than has been 
recognized. Again, we make no claim that the cases we studied were typ-
ical. But the fact that those cases show plaintiffs recovering more in rule 
of reason cases than in pure per se cases—a total recovery of more than 
$20 billion in the rule of reason cases—suggests that a rule of reason 
analysis is not necessarily fatal to plaintiffs. This upsets conventional 
wisdom. 
G. The Relationship Between Private and Public Enforcement 
The twenty new cases we studied cast further light on the relation-
ship between private and public enforcement. As reflected in Table 6 
below, in ten of the twenty newly studied cases, private enforcement was 
not preceded by government action. Although this number represents 
50% of the cases we studied, it reflects only about 11% (slightly over 
$1.2 billion of the $10.7 billion) of the total amounts recovered. 
Table 6: Private Litigation Not Preceded by Government Action 
Case Recovery ($s Millions) 
3M  136 
High Pressure Laminates 46 
MDL v. Hoffman 33 
Methionine 107 
MSG 123.4 







As with the original forty cases, the rest of the story is more com-
plicated. Intel, for example, was primarily a government enforcement 
action, but it also involved a complex and murky interplay between pub-
lic and private efforts at enforcement.96 Further, as indicated in Table 7 
below, private action obtained significantly greater relief than govern-
ment enforcement in three cases. Taking into account these additional 
four cases, in total private enforcement in twelve of the twenty cases—
                     
 96. See Twenty New Cases, supra note 11. 
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accounting for $8.36 billion of the $10.7 billion in recovery—constituted 
more than a mere tagalong to government enforcement. 
Table 7: Private Recoveries That Were Significantly More Inclusive 
Than Government Enforcement Action (In Addition to All of the Com-
pensation to Victims Noted in Table I) (Does Not Include the Cases in 
Table 6 That Were Not Preceded by Government Action) 
 
Case Recovery  
($s Millions) 
Reasons Why Private 
Remedy Was Signifi-
cantly Broader than 
Government Remedy 
EPDM 107 Government investiga-
tions but no legal action 
Tobacco 310 Government investiga-
tion but no legal action 
Visa MC 6813 Government action pro-
vided only injunction 
whereas private actions 
provided compensation 
Total 7230  
 
H. Attorney’s Fees 
As in our original study, we found an inverse relationship between 
the size of a recovery and the percentage of the recovery awarded as at-
torney’s fees. Although fee awards varied significantly within each cate-
gory, in the twenty newer cases counsel tended to recover approximately 
30% to 33.3% in cases with recoveries below $100 million and a similar 
or smaller percentage in cases with recoveries between $100 and $500 
million, with the percentage generally declining as the recovery in-
creased. A notable exception to this rule is the Tricor case, with a 33.3% 
award and a recovery of $316 million. It should be stressed, however, 
that these percentages ignore any injunctive or non-monetary relief ob-
tained by plaintiffs, or the value of the legal precedent established by the 
case. To the extent that these could be valued, the legal fees expressed as 
a percentage of the recoveries should be lowered from the values report-
ed here, perhaps dramatically. 
1294 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1269 
Table 8: Percentage of Recovery Awarded as Attorney’s Fees for  
Recoveries Less than $100 Million 
Case ($s million in recovery) Attorney’s Fees Percentage 
3M 37 (Bradburn); 27.4 (Meijer) 
Electrical Carbon Fiber 25–33.3 
High Pressure Laminates 33.3 
MDL 33.3 




Scrap Metal 2197 
Warfarin 24 
Table 9: Percentage of Recovery Awarded as Attorney’s Fees for  
Recoveries Between $100 Million and $500 million 
Case ($s million in recovery) Attorney’s Fee Percentage 
Air Cargo (Lufthansa) 15 










3m v. Meijer Unknown 
Table 10: Percentage of Recovery Awarded as Attorney’s Fees for  
Recoveries Exceeding $500 Million 
Case ($s million in recovery) Attorney’s Fee Percentage 
Intel Unknown 
Novell v. Microsoft 16.4 
Visa MC Unknown 
 
We were able to ascertain the attorney’s fees in forty-five of the 
sixty large private cases we studied. The fees averaged either 14.3% or 
                     
 97. This percentage may be misleading as the initial attorney’s fee award from settlement was 
30% and the ultimate award was 21% of treble damages after trial (64% of single damages). See 
Twenty New Cases, supra note 11. 
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25.6%, depending on whether a weighted or unweighted average is used 
because larger cases tend to produce attorney’s fees that are a lower per-
centage of the settlement.98 These results were slightly larger than the 
results of an earlier study using a different sample, which found mean 
legal fees of 21.02% and median fees of 9.15% in antitrust class action 
cases.99 As noted earlier, these percentages ignore the value of the in-
junctive relief, non-monetary recoveries, and precedent secured by the 
litigation. 
Thus, the twenty new cases build on our earlier study to provide 
powerful empirical corroboration that private antitrust enforcement has 
provided valuable compensation and deterrence effects, in contravention 
of the established wisdom. With our original conclusions reinforced, we 
turn now to our specific response to the critiques of our previous work. 
II. CRITICISMS OF OUR EARLIER STUDY AND OUR REPLY 
It is perhaps only natural that our provocative position would be 
subjected to criticisms. High-ranking officials at the DOJ have chal-
lenged our views on the relative deterrence effects of private and DOJ 
antitrust enforcement, and a leading antitrust scholar, Professor Daniel 
Crane of the University of Michigan Law School, has leveled a similar 
criticism regarding our stance on compensation. The arguments they 
make, however, at most temper our conclusions—indeed, they merely 
confirm the cautions and qualifications we have already made. None of 
the criticisms of our work survive scrutiny. 
A. Criticisms Concerning Deterrence Issues 
In a recent issue of Antitrust Bulletin, Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. 
Hammond, and Belinda A. Barnett (WHB) challenge our analysis.100 
They assert that our comparison “is more misleading than informa-
tive.”101 Although we understand and admire the instinct of these DOJ 
employees to proclaim the superiority of the remedies secured by the fine 
institution to which they have devoted many years of their lives, their 
specific criticisms fail to undermine our conclusions. In their Antitrust 
Bulletin article, WHB offer six separate critiques of our analysis, which 
we now consider in turn. 
                     
 98. See infra Appendix Tables A6 & A7. 
 99. We note the statistics in Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and 
Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248 (2010). Table 5 
contains statistics for seventy-one antitrust cases and finds mean fees of 21.02% and median fees of 
9.15%. We believe these figures should be compared to our unweighted average of 25.4%. 
 100. See WHB, supra note 9, at 227–33. 
 101. Id. at 229. 
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First, one of the items we included in the DOJ’s deterrence total 
was the monetary equivalent of the 330.24 years that cartel defendants 
were sentenced to prison during the eighteen-year period we studied.102 
WHB complain that we use only $2 million as the deterrence value (or 
disvalue) of a year in prison.103 They assert this figure is too low, but 
never provide a higher figure they believe is acceptable.104 Moreover, the 
only evidence they provide for their assertion that $2 million per year is 
inadequate is their undocumented conclusion that “some” defendants 
spend more than this in legal fees attempting to stay out of prison and 
“some” would pay even more to escape prison outright.105 
However, while our article analyzed a number of approximation 
techniques to arrive at the estimate that a year of prison is “worth” no 
more than $2 million,106 immediately after we did this—in the very next 
paragraph—we tripled it to $6 million because of our stated desire to be 
conservative and our belief that individual sanctions count more than 
corporate sanctions.107 In other words, in the next paragraph we use $6 
million as the equivalent value of a year in prison. We accordingly added 
$6 million—not $2 million—times the number of years in prison to the 
corporate fines and other monetary sanctions to arrive at a total of $7.737 
billion for the deterrence value of DOJ enforcement. This is what we 
compare to the private total.108 WHB also fail to mention our “flip” fig-
ure. We show that only if one disvalues a year in prison as greater than 
$43–$48 million would DOJ anti-cartel enforcement deter more anti-
competitive conduct than private enforcement. This number is based on 
the deterrence effect of just the forty private cases we analyzed;109 we 
                     
 102. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 336. 
 103. See WHB, supra note 9, at 229. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. WHB never provided specifics. For example, do they have evidence that individual 
defendants frequently spend $5 million in legal fees in an attempt to avoid a potential two-year pris-
on sentence? Or that some individual defendants have paid $10 million in legal fees when they might 
face a five-year sentence? WHB presented only assertions. 
 106. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 335 n.72. 
 107. Id. at 336. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 340. Further, we compared the private total to an Antitrust Division total that, as 
WHB concede on page 228 n.84, includes non-antitrust fines secured by the Antitrust Division. 
WHB surely have access to non-public data showing how much of what the Division reports publi-
cally as “antitrust fines” in fact are related to other crimes that they uncovered during the course of 
antitrust investigations. WHB should reveal how much of the fines that we, when we performed our 
study using the data the Antitrust Division published, classified as “DOJ Antitrust fines” actually are 
non-antitrust fines. Because we included these non-antitrust fines, our analysis was too favorable 
towards finding a high amount of deterrence effects from DOJ antitrust activity. 
Similarly, some of the prison time the publically available Antitrust Division statistics attribute 
to antitrust offenses could have resulted from non-antitrust crimes, and not every prison sentence 
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have since documented many hundreds of millions of additional dollars 
that private actors recovered during the same period.110 
We are as mystified over WHB’s criticism for our article allegedly 
using $2 million as the value of a year in prison as we are curious as to 
whether they believe that a year in prison on average should be disvalued 
at more than $43–$48 million. After all, the issue is not the highest 
amount any defendant would pay to avoid prison. For a general compari-
son, one should examine the value or disvalue of a year in prison to the 
average potential antitrust violator. WHB provide no data on this issue. 
For the reasons given in our article we believe that the figure we actually 
used in our analysis—$6 million per year—is conservative and gener-
ous.111 Certainly WHB have done nothing to demonstrate that the figure 
is too low. 
Second, WHB complain that we do not value the stigma or lost fu-
ture income from prison.112 We wish they had provided data on the sig-
nificance or magnitude of this issue. If they had, we would be glad to 
include it in our calculations. 
In fact, we do have some preliminary, highly tentative evidence that 
at least some, and perhaps as many as half, of convicted price fixers go 
back to work in the same industry or even in the same firm after they are 
released from prison.113 We also have evidence that sometimes the cor-
porate attitude is that the person who went to prison “took a bullet for the 
team” and for this reason should be re-hired after their release from pris-
on, perhaps even at a higher salary.114 We also know of anecdotes, such 
as that involving Alfred Taubman, showing little or no stigma or loss of 
social status after release from prison for bid rigging.115 
Maybe on average the future incomes and social status of convicted 
price fixers decreases significantly. But maybe not. However, even if 
their future income decreased by another $1 million for each year of im-
prisonment—a figure we strongly doubt—the actual figure we used as 
the deterrence value of a year in prison, $6 million, should still be more 
than high enough. Moreover, even if the deterrence value of prison were 
increased to make up for lost future wages and social status, we find it 
                                              
was served in full. We urge WHB to provide data that is as accurate as possible so we all could 
perform a fairer DOJ/private comparison. 
 110. See supra Table 1. 
 111. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 335–36. 
 112. See WHB, supra note 9, at 229. 
 113. See Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for 
Private Antitrust Enforcement 36 (July 30, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors); 
see also John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 427 (2012). 
 114. See Connor & Lande, supra note 113, at 480. 
 115. Id. at 439 & n.44–45. 
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inconceivable that a year of prison would have a total disvalue to an in-
dividual of more than the $43–$48 million required to “flip” our calcula-
tions. Only if the yearly deterrence from prison (including lost future 
income and social status) on average exceeded $43–$48 million would 
DOJ anti-cartel enforcement be found to deter more anticompetitive con-
duct than these forty private cases. 
We urge WHB to perform a study of the issues they raise. We urge 
WHB to study the stigma issue—What actually happens to social status 
after price fixers are released from prison? How often do price fixers go 
back to work for their old firms or for other firms in the same industry? 
Are their salaries increased or decreased as a result of their imprison-
ment? Finally, we also urge DOJ to routinely include provisions in plea 
agreements barring convicted price fixers from ever working in the same 
industry in which they fixed prices. 
Third, WHB state that our use of the standard optimal deterrence 
model, which assumes risk neutrality, for entire cartels is inappropriate 
because if the most risk-averse member of a cartel cracks, the cartel will 
crack.116 For this reason the optimal deterrence target need only be the 
most risk-averse member of a cartel. 
This observation is interesting and correct. But it seems likely that 
most cartelists are by nature risk seekers. After all, they form cartels even 
though this subjects them to the risk of getting caught, tried, imprisoned, 
fined, fired, and also subject to the lower social status and future income 
that WHB assert are so significant. Accordingly, the appropriate focus of 
an optimal deterrence calculation actually should be on the most risk-
averse member of a risk-seeking group of cartel members. Is this person 
or corporation a net risk neutral entity, a net risk avoider, or still a net 
risk seeker? We do not know. Neither do WHB, who provide no data to 
help analyze this issue. 
WHB similarly contend that discouraging a single individual in a 
single potential cartel member may suffice to prevent the illegal collusive 
conduct.117 They also assert that criminal penalties may succeed if they 
prevent firms with a substantial market share from violating the antitrust 
laws, in part because it may suffice to discourage even a single potential 
cartel member from participating.118 
This point, however, applies equally to both criminal penalties and 
to the civil liability that arises in private actions. It does not provide a 
reason to conclude one is more effective at deterrence than the other. 
Moreover, even if some members of some firms, or even some entire 
                     
 116. See WHB, supra note 9, at 229–30. 
 117. Id. at 229. 
 118. Id. at 229–30. 
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firms, decline to participate, the cartel nevertheless may still succeed in 
raising prices. After all, to be largely successful, a cartel need not consist 
of every firm in a market, much less every employee of every firm. 
Fourth, WHB argue that we fail to give proper credit to the Anti-
trust Division for its role in recoveries: 
Lande and Davis also are wrong to credit the entire deterrent effect 
of damage recoveries to plaintiffs’ lawyers on the basis that the re-
covery would not have occurred without the efforts of plaintiffs’ 
lawyers. In fact the Antitrust Division does a great deal of the work 
that results in damage recoveries.119 
WHB would be right if we credited private plaintiffs with all the deter-
rence effects from these private cases. We did not. In fact, we explicitly 
stated that credit should be shared: 
The DOJ certainly should get partial credit for the private recoveries 
obtained in any cases it uncovered or helped to uncover, even if the 
private parties secured the bulk of the sanctions. Nevertheless, it 
would not be fair to give the DOJ complete credit for any resulting 
deterrence, because if there had been no private enforcement, this 
deterrence never would have arisen. Rather, the fairest thing would 
be to share credit for this deterrence between the public and private 
enforcers.120 
We believe that ten of the forty private cases we studied were fol-
low-ons to DOJ enforcement efforts.121 This percentage is similar to that 
obtained in the classic study by Kauper and Snyder, who found that no 
more than 20% of all private antitrust cases followed DOJ cases.122 Even 
if DOJ were given partial credit for 25% of the deterrence caused by the 
forty private cases we studied, our overall conclusion would not change 
significantly. 
This is especially true because this relationship is, in some instanc-
es, reversed. Our case studies showed that private enforcement some-
times preceded—and thereby may have significantly assisted—DOJ en-
forcement.123 Indeed, even the much-lauded DOJ leniency program bene-
fits from the threat of private enforcement. As WHB acknowledge, “One 
inducement to apply for leniency, however, is the potential to significant-
                     
 119. Id. at 230. 
 120. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 347. 
 121. Id. at 346. For a discussion of our classification methodology, see Lande & Davis, Bene-
fits, supra note 5, at 897–99. 
 122. For a brief discussion of the Kauper & Snyder study, see Comparative Deterrence, supra 
note 6, at 346. 
 123. For an analysis of these issues, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 897–99. 
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ly limit liability in damages suits.”124 In other words, the threat of private 
enforcement helps to create the leverage necessary to induce antitrust 
violators to confess to the DOJ. 
For all these reasons, the relationship between DOJ and private en-
forcement is symbiotic. And, as a result, crediting private enforcement 
for all the money it recovers would be inaccurate, as would crediting the 
DOJ for all of the penalties it is able to impose through criminal en-
forcement. Our comparison, then, is a rough proxy that may err some-
what in either direction. The “true” ratio of private deterrence to DOJ 
deterrence therefore might not be the simple result that followed from 
our data: ($21.9–$23.9 billion in private sanctions)/($7.737 billion in 
public sanctions),125 which equals a ratio that is roughly 3:1 in favor of 
private deterrence. Whether the actual ratio is 2:1 or 4:1 is beside the 
point; our article’s point is that the ratio for all private cases—not just the 
forty that we studied—is “probably” greater than 1:1. 
Fifth, WHB claim we assert private plaintiffs completely uncovered 
the conduct responsible for two of the thirteen cartel-based recoveries in 
our sample “with the government following the private plaintiffs lead or 
playing no role at all.”126 WHB further state: “In fact the Antitrust Divi-
sion did not ‘follow the private plaintiffs’ lead’ in prosecuting those car-
tels, and any suggestion that the Division ‘played no role at all’ is ridicu-
lous.”127 
However, WHB overlook the “or” in the first sentence they quote. 
We never said the government played no role in these two cases. We said 
only that the first evidence of collusion was uncovered by private parties. 
In fact, we explicitly stated in our case summaries—which WHB cite—
that the government played an important role in both cases. But WHB 
fight this “no role” straw man argument by showing that DOJ played an 
important role.128 Our actual summaries of these cases give the govern-
ment a great deal of credit. 
When we decided whether DOJ or a private party took the “lead,” 
an important piece of evidence was whether DOJ or a private party un-
covered the first evidence of collusion (although of course much more is 
necessary to prove liability). For example, our Vitamins analysis con-
tained the caveat: 
                     
 124. See WHB, supra note 9, at 233. 
 125. As noted earlier, this includes prison time valued at $6 million per year, not $2 million per 
year. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 336. 
 126. See WHB, supra note 9, at 231. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 232–33. 
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[M]any of the details of the Department of Justice investigation are 
non-public, and it is clear that both private counsel and the U.S. De-
partment of Justice were on parallel tracks and discovered much of 
the critical evidence at around the same time, and that the investiga-
tion of each helped that of the other.129 
Our analysis of the Vitamins case fairly relied on the report provid-
ed by David Boies, counsel for private plaintiffs. Boies reported that 
when his firm found the first evidence of a cartel in February 1997 “there 
was no pending federal investigation.”130 WHB never state that Boies is 
incorrect or unreliable, but WHB do say that there had been an ongoing 
federal investigation.131 However, we cited information that the DOJ in-
vestigation had stalled before private counsel provided them with im-
portant collusion evidence: 
“U.S. investigators first got wind of the vitamins cartel and Roche’s 
role in it in late 1996 from sources at ADM cooperating with the 
DOJ in its investigation of the citric acid cartel . . .” As a result the 
FBI interviewed Dr. Kumo Sommer, the head of Roche’s Vitamins 
division, in March 1997. “Sommer denied the existence of any vit-
amin cartel, and the DOJ apparently decided to wind down its in-
vestigation for the meanwhile. . . .” However, “in late 1997, a part-
ner of the law firm Boies & Schiller . . .” presented the DOJ with 
evidence that a conspiracy was occurring.132 
Moreover, in our Vitamins case study we wrote: “We attempted to find a 
public account of the origin of the vitamins cases written by the Depart-
ment of Justice Antitrust Division but could not. When we sent them the 
version contained in this document they would not comment on its accu-
racy or completeness.”133 Further, on the crucial importance of the early 
private suit we cited the following: 
At the May 21, 1999 press conference in Basel, Switzerland an-
nouncing the Roche guilty pleas, Hoffman-La Roche’s CEO, Franz 
Humer, explained how it was the early 1998 class action lawsuit 
(and not a government investigation) that prompted a new internal 
investigation that caused Roche to terminate its conspiratorial con-
duct and begin to cooperate with the government: “In 1997, re-
sponding to the settlement in the citric acid case and to the news of 
an investigation of the bulk vitamins industry, Roche initiated an in-
                     
 129. See Forty Case Studies, supra note 6, at 237. 
 130. DAVID BOIES, COURTING JUSTICE 231 (1st ed. 2004). 
 131. See WHB, supra note 9, at 232. 
 132. See Forty Case Studies, supra note 6, at 237 n.645 (quoting John M. Connor, supra note 
24, at 25–26). 
 133. Id. at 236 n.642. 
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ternal inquiry of its own, which at the time did not turn any evi-
dence of wrongdoing. A second internal inquiry prompted by class 
action lawsuits filed against Roche and other companies in early 
1998 for alleged price-fixing in the bulk vitamins market revealed 
that further action was needed. The inquiry was carried out in col-
laboration with U.S. experts. Internal measures were implemented 
without delay to ensure an immediate halt to any antitrust viola-
tions. The findings this second inquiry formed the basis for Roche’s 
decision to offer, on 1 March this year, its full cooperation in the US 
Justice Department investigation.” (See Exh. 9 to Class Plaintiffs’ 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of 
Niacin and Biotin Defendants, at 3.)134 
We therefore stand by our description of the Vitamins case as led by a 
private party based on the evidence that was then—and is now—
available. 
WHB fail to provide any evidence to support their argument related 
to the second case involving a commercial explosives cartel. WHB as-
sert: 
Lande and Davis credit the detection of one other cartel to plain-
tiffs’ lawyers. They report that an explosives cartel was discovered 
in the course of private litigation of a noncartel case. They do not 
indicate when evidence of a cartel emerged, but they do indicate 
that the antitrust claims leading to significant damage recovery were 
filed in February and August 1996. But that was after the Division 
had secured guilty pleas from the conspirators, and evidence uncov-
ered in the private litigation did not prompt the Division’s investiga-
tion.135 
Concerning this case we wrote the following: “This litigation and 
the government investigation that followed apparently arose out of a 
1992 private civil suit initiated by Thermex Energy Corporation 
(Thermex), a Texas manufacturer of commercial explosives, against At-
las Powder Company, owned by Imperial Chemical Industries P.L.C. of 
Britain (ICI).”136 Our case summary certainly gave DOJ a large share of 
the credit for bringing this cartel to justice: “In September 1995, the De-
partment of Justice secured guilty pleas and fines for two of the defend-
ants in the Commercial Explosives litigation . . . .” 137 
If a secret DOJ investigation uncovered evidence of collusion be-
fore the 1992 unrelated private action began, then this case should indeed 
                     
 134. Id. at 239–40. 
 135. See WHB, supra note 9, at 232–33. 
 136. See Forty Case Studies, supra note 6, at 61. 
 137. Id. at 62. 
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be removed from the list of cases where private enforcers first discovered 
the evidence of collusion. But WHB have not provided this evidence. 
Nor have they asserted that a DOJ investigation discovered evidence of 
collusion before the 1992 private case. Further, we note WHB implicitly 
concede that DOJ played no role at all in eleven of the thirteen cases in 
this group by disputing our factual analysis of only two. 
More generally, our article contained the caveats that “reasonable 
people could dispute who first discovered some of the violations that 
gave rise to the sample of 40 private cases” or which party actually took 
the lead, and also that we could use only imperfect publicly available 
data to perform our study.138 It is only natural for DOJ and the private 
parties to see the facts differently—for both DOJ and the private parties 
to see ambiguous facts in a way that tends to give themselves more of the 
credit for uncovering and proving the violations at issue.139 Indeed, they 
might not have always been aware of what the other lawyers were doing, 
and so naturally assumed that they deserved the bulk of the credit. 
Finally, WHB claim that after the Supreme Court’s recent Twombly 
decision, private plaintiffs will be much more reliant on the DOJ to un-
cover and prosecute antitrust violations.140 This may well be true. But it 
would not affect the results of our study, which covered the 1990–2007 
period. Moreover, once sufficient time has passed the relative deterrence 
effects of private and DOJ antitrust enforcement should be re-assessed 
not by speculation, but on the basis of evidence. Indeed, the antitrust 
world’s general failure to base policy on evidence has caused great mis-
chief. Twombly itself was based on an empirical premise that was both 
unsubstantiated and implausible—the assumption that the sorts of 
wealthy and powerful corporations that are the subject of antitrust law-
suits often settle even meritless claims for huge sums.141 
In conclusion, WHB provide no reason to doubt our article’s find-
ings. Indeed, the article showed that private enforcement “probably” de-
ters more anticompetitive activity than the DOJ’s anti-cartel program 
after comparing the deterrence effects of only forty of the many private 
cases filed during an eighteen-year period with the deterrence from every 
DOJ cartel case filed during the same period. A fortiori, the deterrence 
effects from every private enforcement action might well have been 
                     
 138. See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at 346. 
 139. WHB’s complaint over credit for two of the forty cases we studied helps prove the prov-
erb, “Success has many fathers while failure is an orphan.” 
 140. See WHB, supra note 9, at 231. 
 141. See Politics of Procedure, supra note 50, at 969, 978–81; Questionable Innovation, supra 
note 50, at 356, 369–74; see also Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and 
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (rejecting the argument that class actions constitute a 
form of legalized blackmail). 
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many times larger than that from the DOJ anti-cartel program. The new 
case studies presented above demonstrate that our initial study was con-
servative, as was our overall conclusion that private enforcement “proba-
bly” deters more conduct than DOJ private enforcement.142 
We stress that we did not perform this comparison to denigrate in 
any manner the excellent work performed by the Antitrust Division, of 
which we remain huge fans. Indeed, we would like to reemphasize that 
private enforcement and public enforcement, on the whole, work won-
derfully well together and in harmony toward the goal of promoting the 
public interest. 
Rather, we undertook our analysis to determine whether private en-
forcement is underappreciated and deserves a significant share of the 
credit for deterring anticompetitive conduct. Although we appreciate that 
WHB studied our article and we enjoy discussing the details of our anal-
ysis, we believe it would be more productive to focus instead on design-
ing ways for private and public enforcement to cooperate to better ap-
proximate an optimal level of deterrence for anticompetitive conduct. 
B. Criticisms Concerning Compensation Issues 
The leading critic of our original study’s conclusions concerning 
the compensation effects of private antitrust enforcement has been Uni-
versity of Michigan Law Professor Daniel Crane.143 Responding directly 
to our past analysis, he asserted that private enforcement does not pro-
vide meaningful compensation to the victims of antitrust violations. His 
overall claim could not be much more ambitious: 
Efforts to correct the perceived infirmities of the U.S. private en-
forcement system by tweaking the mechanics of enforcement—
standing rules, discovery principles, claim aggregation mechanisms, 
damages rules, and the like—are futile. The shortcomings of private 
enforcement are existential, not technical. They go to foundational 
                     
 142. In a related point, WHB argue that private litigation against small cartels often is not 
viable. WHB, supra note 9, at 228 n.82. This is a fair point, and a reason to make private actions less 
costly and therefore viable in a broader range of cases. 
 On the other hand, there are also a significant number of cases that the DOJ will not prosecute, 
either because of a limited DOJ budget, because they are not the kinds of traditional cartel cases that 
DOJ pursues, or because the odds of the DOJ prevailing are not sufficiently high. In fact, the ex-
traordinary success rate of DOJ prosecutions suggests it is unwilling to take a significant risk of 
losing in litigation, which means a substantial amount of illegal conduct will go unpunished. For a 
discussion of these and related points, see Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at 905–07. 
 In sum, DOJ criminal enforcement works better in some cases and private enforcement works 
better in others. This is further evidence that public and private enforcement complement one anoth-
er, both working in the direction of the public good. 
 143. See INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, supra note 10, at 168; Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, 
at 682–95. 
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assumptions about the goals and purposes of antitrust law and com-
petition policy. Private antitrust enforcement in the United States 
has rarely advanced the two assumed goals of private antitrust en-
forcement: namely, deterrence and compensation.144 
Professor Crane’s arguments, however, do not come close to supporting 
his bold position. They suggest, at most, reasons to question whether pri-
vate antitrust enforcement is as effective as it could be, not to declare it 
“futile” and to deny the value of its very existence. Because Professor 
Crane issued a direct challenge only to our analysis of the efficacy of 
private enforcement as a means of providing compensation, we will ad-
dress that portion of his argument in this Article.145 
Professor Crane begins his argument by making the sweeping as-
sertion that “issuing [class members] a check is often so expensive that 
administrative costs swallow the entire recovery.”146 To support this 
statement Professor Crane cites a single forty-one-year-old Posner article 
that made a similar claim without empirical support.147 Nevertheless, 
Professor Crane continues: “[A]fter lawyers’ fees and administrative fees 
are accounted for, each consumer’s share of the recovery is negligible, 
even though the harm to the class is great.”148 From this kind of state-
ment one might think his conclusion was the result of an empirical sur-
vey of twenty cases in which, for example, the average legal fees of 33% 
and average claims administration expenses of 50% left very little for 
injured victims, such as only a few dollars each and perhaps only 20% of 
the settlement fund. However, Professor Crane provides no empirical 
evidence at all for his assertions. 
As support Professor Crane cites only an article by Professor 
Cavanagh, another highly respected scholar.149 Professor Cavanagh’s 
article, in turn, provides only anecdotes and hypotheticals involving the 
                     
 144. See INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, supra note 10, at 163; Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, 
at 676–77. 
 145. Professor Crane also argued that private enforcement does not help deter anticompetitive 
conduct. Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, at 676–77. Since his deterrence argument was not directly 
responsive to our research, however, we will explain on another occasion why it is similarly unper-
suasive. 
 146. Id. at 683. 
 147. Id. at 683 n.30. 
 148. Id. at 683. Professor Crane’s remark may well reflect the conventional wisdom in anti-
trust. This belief was ably summarized by Professor Cavanagh: “Many class action suits generate 
substantial fees for counsel but produce little, if any, benefit to the alleged victims of the wrongdo-
ing.” Edward Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. REV. 147, 214 (2005). Professor 
Cavanagh, however, provides only an anecdote to support these conclusions. He makes no effort to 
assess whether the types of settlements he describes are in fact “not atypical.” Id. He provides no 
data to show how often antitrust class action cases result in useless remedies. 
 149. See Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, at 683 n.34 (citing Cavanagh, supra note 145, at 
214). 
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use of coupons, but not the size of any actual administrative costs. Fur-
ther, Cavanagh does not offer any data on the size of legal fees or any 
data concerning the frequency of coupon settlements. Neither scholar 
provides data showing whether administrative costs average 50% of set-
tlements or 5%. Nor do they offer data revealing whether legal fees aver-
age 15% or 33% or whether the residual for victims is 75% or 15%. The 
difference is, however, crucial. Without evidentiary support, Professor 
Crane’s assertion that legal fees and administrative fees “often swallow 
the entire recovery” is simply an unsupported opinion that should not be 
given any weight. The limited information we have been able to assem-
ble, moreover, suggests that his opinion is unlikely to be correct. 
As noted above, we were able to ascertain the attorney’s fees in for-
ty-five of the sixty large private cases we studied. The mean fees aver-
aged somewhere between 14% (if a weighted average is used) to 26% 
(using an unweighted average, thus giving each case equal weight).150 If 
we are trying to gauge the total amount of compensation that reached the 
plaintiffs, the weighted average would be more appropriate because it 
weighs more heavily the larger settlements—which have a larger effect 
on compensation and involve a lower percentage allocated to attorney’s 
fees. 
We did not attempt to ascertain the costs of administering the set-
tlement funds when we analyzed the sixty large private cases in our 
study. Moreover, even though the required information is a matter of 
public record, it has been difficult to convince busy attorneys or claims 
administrators to spend time searching their files for the relevant materi-
al. We were, however, able to find two claims administration firms, Rust 
Consulting and Class Action & Claims Solutions, 151 who were willing to 
assemble and supply relevant data from their recent cases. The thirty-one 
results they supplied are instructive, although they were for the most part 
unwilling to identify the cases at issue. We separately obtained infor-
mation about the Visa/MasterCard case. 152 The following Table summa-
rizes the data: 
                     
 150. See supra Tables 4, 5 & 6. 
 151. We are extremely grateful to Rust Consulting and to Class Action & Claims Solutions for 
this information. 
 152. We asked a large number of potential sources, including both claims administration firms 
and individual attorneys, for the administrative fees associated with as many antitrust class action 
cases as they could produce. But the most of the potential sources were too busy or for other reasons 
declined to supply us with this information. We have no way of knowing whether those who did 
supply us with information are typical. 
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Case 1 2003 Direct 0.90% $35,000,000  
Case 2 2004 Direct 1.67% $104,600,000  
Case 3 2004 Direct 6.96% $6,200,000  
Case 4 2004 Direct 3.86% $202,845,329  
Case 5 2004 Direct 3.06% $32,000,000  
Case 6 2004 Direct 7.95% $34,000,000  
Case 7 2004 Direct 1.95% $31,500,000  
Case 8 2004 Direct 2.91% $89,194,765  
Case 9 2004 Direct 4.07% $9,000,000  
Case 10 2004 Direct 4.54% $9,330,000  
Case 11 2004 Direct 2.27% $64,000,000  
Case 12 2004 Direct 5.86% $9,700,000  
Case 13 2004 Direct 4.18% $21,000,000  
Lupron 
Consumer 2005 Indirect 6.33% 
More than $10 
Million 
Relafen 
Consumer 2005 Indirect 5.30% 
More than $10 
Million 
Case 16 2005 Indirect 4.14% More than $10 Million 
Case 17 2005 Indirect 2.87% More than $10 Million 
Case 18 2005 Indirect 5.01% More than $10 Million 
Case 19 2005 Direct 6.26% $22,600,000 
Case 20 2006 Direct 4.17% $38,700,000 
Case 21 2007 Indirect 3.95% More than $10 Million 
Case 22 2007 Indirect 9.25% More than $10 Million 
Case 23 2008 Indirect 4.43% More than $10 Million 
Case 24 2008 Indirect 8.13% More than $10 Million 
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Case 25 2008 Direct 1.85% $6,354,441 





2009  Indirect 7.09% 
More than $10 
Million 
Case 28 2009 Indirect 5.46% More than $10 Million 
Case 29 2009 Direct 0.38% $60,000,000 
Case 30 2009 Direct 0.88% $14,650,000 




2005 Direct 2.34% $3,456,000,000 
Average    4.10%   
 
The administrative costs in the cases, all of which had claim filing 
deadlines between 2003 and 2010, averaged 4% of the recoveries (with 
the average (mean) calculated by giving each case equal weight). All 
were less than 10%. These thirty-two cases, moreover, were mostly 
moderate153 in size: twenty-seven involved settlements of $6–$70 million 
each and the largest was $250 million—except for the massive Vi-
sa/MasterCard case.154 There are fixed costs associated with returning 
overcharges to victims, so it would be logical for the percentage of ad-
ministrative costs to be smaller for larger cases and to be largest for the 
smallest recoveries. Indeed, in one of the largest antitrust cases in histo-
ry, the Visa/MasterCard case, the administrative fees were particularly 
                     
 153. Id. Although in many respects $6–$70 million is a large settlement, the majority of the 
sixty cases in our study involved settlements of more than $100 million, and nine were at least $700 
million. 
 154. Id. 
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low as a percentage.155 They required an expenditure of 2.34% of the 
settlement fund to distribute more than $3 billion.156 
Thus, the average of the legal fees for the forty-five cases in our 
sample we were able to ascertain (their weighted average was 14% and 
their unweighted average was 26%) plus the average of these administra-
tive costs (which were 4% for the sample of thirty-two cases) would total 
approximately 18% to 30% of the settlements. If these averages apply to 
our entire sample,157 this would mean that the victims received 70% to 
82% of the settlements.158 Since the settlements totaled at least $33.8 to 
$35.8 billion (plus products, discounts, etc.) this would mean that the 
victims in the sixty cases we studied received at least $23.66 to $29.4 
billion in cash. 
To be sure, we make no representation that these thirty-two cases 
are typical of antitrust class action settlements.159 We readily concede 
                     
 155. “The class members received $3,456,000,000. The attorney fees were $225,165,006.25. 
The total expenses were $88,333,552.89 of which $57,234,450.87 were for the claims administrator, 
$18,716,511.44 were expenses awarded by the Court to the class representatives and class counsel in 
the decision approving the settlement and awarding fees and costs and $12,382,590.58 in supple-
mental expenses approved by the Court which included items such as the objectors’ fees, the special 
master appointed by the court, counsel fees for lawyers and consultants who worked on the securiti-
zation, audit fees and supplemental costs incurred by lead counsel . . . [and] $1,748,505.93 awarded 
to three Cy Pres recipients.” E-mail from Lloyd Constantine, Counsel, Cannon, LLP to Robert H. 
Lande, Venable Prof. of Law, Univ. of Baltimore Sch. of Law (Nov. 9, 2011, 17:43 EST) (on file 
with author). 
 156. Including all the expenses, the administrative costs were $88.33 million divided by  
($3,456 million plus $225.17 million attorney’s fees plus $88.33 administrative expenses plus $1.75 
million in cy pres, which equals $3,771.25 million), which equals 2.34%. 
 157. We were almost always able to ascertain the legal fees for class action cases, but had 
problems finding the legal fees for competitor cases. We have no empirical evidence on point, but 
believe that legal fees in competitor cases may be lower on average. Class action attorneys often 
have to charge more because they are working on a contingency. Because they receive nothing if 
they lose, they have to charge a premium to cover their risk of failure. By contrast, attorneys in com-
petitor cases are less likely to be working on a contingency basis. 
 158. These numbers likely understate the recovery. We did not use a weighted average. Doing 
so would arguably be appropriate because it would reflect that cases with a greater recovery have a 
larger impact on the success of private enforcement compensating victims. A weighted average 
would have lowered the percentage, given that larger cases generally involve a lower percentage of 
administrative fees. 
 159. As discussed in note 149 supra, we have no way of knowing whether those who did sup-
ply us with information are typical. To be sure, the data we collected are suggestive. Eleven of these 
cases involved payments to indirect purchasers, and these cases averaged 5.6% in administrative 
costs, while the twenty-one direct purchaser cases averaged 3.1%. Moreover, it makes intuitive sense 
that direct purchaser classes, which would be expected to have fewer members and about which 
defendants are likely to have better information and means of communication, would involve lower 
administrative costs than indirect purchaser classes, which are likely to have more members and 
gathering information about them and communicating with them is apt to be more difficult. Since the 
cases were not randomly selected and are few in number, we hesitate to come to a strong conclusion 
that indirect purchaser cases involve higher administrative costs than direct purchaser cases. More 
research is needed. 
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there have been cases necessitating substantially higher administrative 
costs.160 Nevertheless, at a minimum we can reach the safe conclusion 
that there have been a number of antitrust class action cases that, after 
legal fees and claims administration expenses are subtracted, returned in 
the range of 70% to 82% of the recovery to victims. And there also have 
been unusual cases, like the Visa/MasterCard case, that returned more 
than 90% of a settlement to plaintiffs.161 
It also should be noted that the victims in the cases we studied 
sometimes received products, coupons, or discounts. The methodology 
of our study was to be conservative by not counting the compensatory 
effects of products, coupons, discounts or rate reductions. Due to our 
omissions we stated that our study was providing only a lower bound on 
the compensation effects of these cases. If Professor Crane is fairly going 
to argue that these cases have not meaningfully compensated victims, as 
opposed to only calculating a lower bound on the benefits of these cases, 
he should have included these omissions back into the analysis to the 
extent they were valuable to the victims. For example, the relief in the 
Auction House Cases included $125 million in coupons,162 which we 
conservatively did not count as a cash benefit. These coupons were fully 
transferable (and were in fact transferred) and fully redeemable in cash if 
not used for five years.163 We would be very interested in knowing why 
he dismisses these coupons as unworthy of consideration as compensa-
tion for the real victims of the collusion at issue. 
We certainly would prefer to generalize from larger and better sam-
ples. But it should be noted that critics who assert that the total of legal 
fees and administrative expenses “often swallow the entire recovery” 
offer no evidence to support their statements. 
Another argument by Professor Crane is that compensation “fails” 
as a goal because the illegal overcharges are passed through various lay-
ers in the distribution chain, so the recoveries do not end up with the real 
victims of the initial overcharges.164 Professor Crane “proves” this using 
a “typical” example—a hypothetical dominant medical equipment manu-
facturer entering into exclusive contracts with hospitals that unlawfully 
                     
 160. We do not know of a specific example. But surely there have been small class action cases 
with extremely high administrative costs and 33% attorney’s fees. 
 161. As noted, the administrative expenses in this case were 2.34%. The attorney’s fees were 
$225.17 million, divided by the total of $3,771.25 million, which equals 5.97%. In 2007 we reported 
legal fees in this case of 6.5%. We believe the difference is due to the fact that the settlement earned 
interest before it was distributed. Regardless, the total of legal fees and administrative expenses was 
less than 10%. See Twenty Case Studies, supra note 11. 
 162. See Forty Cases, supra note 6, at 13–18. 
 163. These coupons were 20% of the legal fees in this case. Id. 
 164. Id. 
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lock out competitors and allow the manufacturer to charge a monopoly 
price. In his hypothetical, the distributors originally pay the overcharge, 
and some, but not all, of that overcharge is passed on to the hospitals. 
The hospital also passes along some, but not all, of the overcharge to the 
patients. The patients are not often directly affected, because they pay an 
insurance co-pay, and so the insurance companies pay the bulk of the 
overcharge.165 
It is telling that Professor Crane characterizes his lone hypothetical 
as “typical.” His hypothetical involves monopoly exclusion, but most 
significant private recoveries are against illegal collusion,166 which usual-
ly is far simpler to analyze. Moreover, the medical industry involves an 
anomalous market, one in which insurance plays an unusual role and in-
termediaries often charge based on their costs. Even though Crane could 
have assembled a group of ten or twenty actual cases to analyze, on the 
basis of his lone exclusive-dealing hypothetical he dismisses the more 
than $12 billion paid to direct purchasers in the cases studied in our ear-
lier survey: “Since direct purchasers often pass along a substantial por-
tion of any overcharges downstream, over two-thirds of the recoveries 
studied [those involving direct purchasers] likely failed to compensate 
the parties who ultimately absorbed most of the economic injury.”167 
Crucially, Crane does not analyze what happened to the overcharg-
es or the subsequent recoveries in any of the direct purchaser cases in our 
study (or in any other actual cases). He merely asserts that the direct pur-
                     
 165. See Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, at 681–82: 
To see why private enforcement fails at compensating for wealth transfer, consider 
the chain of loss-causation in a typical antitrust claim. A dominant durable medical 
equipment manufacturer enters into exclusive dealing contracts with hospitals and the 
group purchasing organizations (“GPOs”) that bargain on the hospitals’ behalf. The ex-
clusive contracts unlawfully lock out potential competitors and allow the manufacturer to 
charge a monopoly price. In the first instance, the monopoly overcharge is paid by dis-
tributors that stock goods for the hospitals. The hospitals have complex billing arrange-
ments with the distributors in which some, but not all, of the overcharge is passed on to 
the hospital. The hospitals then pass along some, but not necessarily all, of this over-
charge to their patients. 
The patients are often not directly affected by the overcharge. This is because the 
patients’ co-pay for using hospital services remains initially unaffected; their insurance 
companies pay the bulk of the passed-on overcharge. The insurance companies may 
eventually increase their premiums or co-pays, but these future increases may fall on a 
different set of insured than those who received monopoly-priced services. For large clas-
ses of patients such as the indigent and the elderly, any overcharge borne by the hospitals 
may be passed onto taxpayers in the form of Medicare, Medicaid, or direct hospital sub-
sidization. This complex scenario has countless analogues in the world of manufacturing, 
sales, and distribution. Thus, a monopoly overcharge often produces numerous ripples in 
the economy. 
 166. See Lande & Davis, Benefits, supra note 5, at Tables 8–10, pp. 912–13. 
 167. See Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, at 682. 
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chasers “often” pass on “a substantial portion” of the overcharges, so that 
direct purchaser cases “likely fail[] to compensate the parties who ulti-
mately absorb[] most of the economic injury.”168 In reality, Crane does 
not know the percentage of the recoveries that was returned to actual vic-
tims in the cases we studied. Yet, on the basis of his conjecture, he com-
pletely dismisses more than $12 billion in overcharges paid to direct pur-
chasers as not having compensated the true victims of antitrust viola-
tions. 
Crane instead could have analyzed the direct purchaser cases in the 
study he cites. He could have delved into the facts of the Auction House 
Cases, for example, where firms were convicted of conspiring to raise 
auction commission rates.169 We would be extremely interested in the 
results if he analyzed how much of the $552 million recovery ultimately 
went to people who were victimized by the cartel; we would be puzzled 
unless, not counting the 5.2% that went for attorney’s fees, almost all 
went to the real victims of the collusion. But Crane does not even con-
sider the possibility that almost all of the direct purchasers could have 
been end users directly affected by the collusion. 
 To be sure, in some cases firms surely pass a percentage of the 
overcharge to direct purchasers to the next level in the distribution chain. 
But it also is true that direct purchasers often recover in settlement only a 
fraction of the overcharges they pay, an amount that does not fully com-
pensate them for their losses.170 Suppose, for example, that a cartel over-
charged direct purchasers by $100 million, and that direct purchasers 
pass 50% of this overcharge to the next level in the distribution chain. 
Also suppose that the direct purchasers received only 30% of the amount 
they were overcharged. Even if a victimized direct purchaser passed on 
50% of the overcharge to its own customers, the direct victim still had a 
net loss, an initial loss of $50 million that was only 60% compensated by 
the settlement.171 
There is, moreover, another type of harm to direct purchasers that 
Crane does not consider. When direct purchasers pay higher prices, to 
the extent they pass on these increases they tend to sell a lower quantity 
of the product involved. This lower volume reduces their profit. Thus, 
                     
 168. Id. at 684. 
 169. See Forty Case Studies, supra note 6, at 13–18. 
 170. See Connor & Lande, supra note 113. 
 171. See John M. Connor, Private Recoveries In International Cartel Cases Worldwide: What  
do the Data Show? 1, 14 (American Antitrust Institute, Working Paper No. 12-03, 2012), available 
at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/~antitrust/sites/default/files/WorkingPaperNo12-03.pdf (finding 
that U.S. victims in a sample of thirty-three international cartels received only 30% of single damag-
es in settlement on average). In this hypothetical the indirect purchaser also absorbed a $50 million 
overcharge, but received nothing in the recovery. 
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even if some direct purchasers initially appeared to receive excessive 
compensation as a result of an antitrust case, this appearance may well be 
misleading unless their lost profits also were replaced. 
For these reasons Crane’s argument should have been that it is pos-
sible that some of the $12 billion in recoveries received by direct pur-
chasers in the cases we studied might not have compensated the actual 
victims of antitrust violations. But he does not prove that even this actu-
ally happened to a significant extent. His arguments certainly do not jus-
tify discounting all payments made to direct purchasers. 172 
Professor Crane’s analysis of payments made to indirect purchasers 
in our study is similarly faulty. He writes: “[O]ne should also consider 
the $1.815 billion recovered in the six indirect purchaser cases to gauge 
whether these recoveries help to offset the phenomenon . . . . [especially 
the huge] El Paso litigation, which resulted in a $1.4 billion recovery for 
the indirect purchasers. . . . In each case, the settlement pot was further 
reduced by an attorney’s fee award, generally in the 20 to 33 percent 
range.”173 However, the attorney’s fees in the case Crane primarily ana-
lyzes, the El Paso case,174 constituted only 6% of the settlement, a fact 
Crane strikingly omits from his narrative.175 
Crane has more to say about the El Paso case, which yielded $1.4 
billion for indirect purchasers:176 
[T]he settlement provided for a complex scheme of remittances to 
the California Public Utilities Commission and for natural gas rate 
reductions over fifteen to twenty years. . . . One may describe the El 
Paso scheme as compensating consumers as a class, but such a de-
scription would be largely inaccurate. This is because consumer in-
juries occurring in the past correspond only roughly to future con-
sumer gains. Injured consumers who died, moved away from Cali-
fornia, or discontinued natural gas service over the rate-reduction 
period received no compensation, or they received compensation 
that bore little relation to the amount of their injury. On the other 
                     
 172. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Indirect Purchaser Suits and the Consumer 
Interest, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 531, 544 (2003) (suggesting that direct purchasers at times may not 
be able to pass on overcharges). 
 173. See Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, at 685. 
 174. See Forty Case Studies, supra note 6, at 77–87 (analyzing the El Paso case). 
 175. Professor Crane also argues that the $1.815 billion in indirect purchaser recoveries should 
be reduced for attorney’s fees. Although one might be able justify doing this, it also would make 
sense to express all values in constant dollars. The El Paso settlement was in 2001, but Professor 
Crane published his article in 2010. If El Paso’s $1.427 billion recovery were reduced by 6% for 
attorney’s fees, down to $1.341 billion, but expressed in 2010 dollars, it would actually be a higher 
amount: $1.65 billion. But Professor Crane performs only downward adjustments in the amounts 
victims recover from lawbreakers. 
 176. See Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, at 685–86. 
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hand, consumers who moved to California or otherwise began natu-
ral gas consumption after the violation received a windfall. In sum, 
consumers whose consumption patterns or volume changed signifi-
cantly from the time of the violation to the rate-reduction period 
were either overcompensated or undercompensated. The El Paso 
settlement did not amount to a serious effort to identify persons who 
suffered economic harm and compensate them in proportion to their 
loss.177 
However, Crane ignores crucial facts in this case, even though he cites to 
our eleven-page analysis of the facts four times.178 As we reported, the 
settlement included $551 million in upfront cash and stock valued at 
market rates. Crane omits this in his description of the case’s benefits. 
Surely upfront payments to consumers do a wonderful job of compensat-
ing the actual victims of a violation. Moreover, our analysis of this case 
noted that we (perhaps being overly conservative) did not count the set-
tlement’s $125 million in future rate reductions on electricity as a benefit 
from the case.179 
The $876 million in cash payments that will be made to victims in 
the future are more difficult to analyze. It certainly is true there will not 
be a perfect correspondence between the 13 million California consum-
ers and 3,000 businesses who were overcharged by El Paso and the fu-
ture beneficiaries of the settlement. But even if a consumer sells her 
home soon after the settlement was inked, to the extent the market was 
efficient—which economists so often assume—the value of the house 
should have increased accordingly, since the purchaser of the house will 
be receiving a share of the settlement. The homeowners at the time of the 
settlement should have reaped the capitalized value of the discounted 
present value of the settlement when they sold their home. 
To the extent the market is not efficient, however, we ultimately do 
not know, for example, how many California residents will leave the 
state after they have collected only five years of cash payments. But nei-
ther does Professor Crane. Rather, he points out that the correspondence 
between the overcharge and the recovery is imperfect, speculates about 
and magnifies this imperfection and, on the basis of a mismatch whose 
extent is unproven, dismisses the entire $1.427 billion settlement, saying 
that it would be “largely inaccurate” to say that the settlement compen-
sated the victims. While we agree that the settlement did not produce 
perfect compensation, Crane has not given us any information on which 
to dismiss the recovery completely or even “largely.” 
                     
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Forty Case Studies, supra note 6, at 77. 
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Crane adopts another analytic strategy that causes him to discount 
the value of the compensation obtained through private antitrust en-
forcement. “Economists and antitrust scholars increasingly view static 
consumer injuries as far less significant than dynamic injuries.”180 In oth-
er words, scholarly commentators are much more concerned with the 
tendency of antitrust violations to stifle innovation than they are with its 
tendency to increase the prices consumers must pay for existing goods. 
Crane then contends that antitrust laws fail to compensate consumers 
adequately because they tend to focus on static injuries—for example, 
the paying of overcharges—rather than on dynamic injuries—such as a 
loss of access to new products. 
In this regard Professor Crane is mixing apples and oranges. The 
prevailing view among scholarly commentators has long been that the 
primary, if not exclusive, focus of antitrust doctrine should be on creat-
ing efficient incentives, not on compensating victims.181 Thus, he cites 
Professor Hovenkamp’s statement that innovation and technological pro-
gress contribute more to “economic growth” than does achieving the 
right level of static efficiency.182 This view of law as serving to create 
ideal incentives rather than to redress past wrongs is largely the result of 
the injection of Chicago School economic analysis into antitrust.183 For 
these commentators, compensating victims is just a means to an end, not 
an end in itself. 
When Crane concludes that dynamic injuries matter more than stat-
ic injuries, he is improperly importing views about incentives—and de-
terrence—into a discussion about compensation. When it comes to com-
pensating for injuries from anticompetitive behavior, Crane offers no 
reason why a consumer suffers any lesser injury from paying an extra 
$1,000 for a good than from being deprived of an opportunity to buy a 
superior good that would be worth an additional $1,000 to her. Consid-
ered prospectively—viewed in terms of economic growth—innovation is 
much more important than static efficiency, but this does not mean as a 
matter of retributive justice $1,000 worth of one sort of harm is any more 
significant than $1,000 of another sort of harm. To the contrary, econo-
mists assume harms that can properly be measured at $1,000 are of pre-
cisely equal value to a victim, whatever that $1,000 represents.184 If Pro-
                     
 180. Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, at 688. 
 181. The authors of this Article believe that an important purpose of the antitrust laws is to 
compensate victims, but we acknowledge that this position may not be the prevailing view among 
antitrust scholars. 
 182. Crane, Optimizing, supra note 2, at 688 n.62. 
 183. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23–25 (4th ed. 1992). 
 184. Id. 
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fessor Crane has a different view, he should develop a theory of compen-
sation in antitrust to justify it. 
In sum, this article presented documentation that sixty private cases 
that ended since 1990 have returned more than $33 billion in cash, plus 
additional amounts in coupons, discounts, products, etc., to victims of 
anticompetitive behavior. Surely this should create a heavy presumption 
that a significant number of victims have been helped a substantial 
amount by private litigation. Responsible critics can plausibly argue that 
some of this $30 billion in recoveries might not have compensated the 
actual victims of antitrust violations. We would agree with such a quali-
fication. But neither Crane nor any other critic has shown that this has 
happened to a predominant extent. Yet, only if it happens to such an ex-
tent that it can be shown to “swallow” the $33 billion—as Professor 
Crane asserts but does not substantiate—should we dismiss the compen-
sation effects of private litigation. 
We believe the overwhelming weight of the evidence shows that 
antitrust cases have returned huge amounts of compensation to the true 
victims of antitrust violation (including a significant portion of the $33 
billion documented in this study, plus coupons, products, rate reductions, 
etc.). We concede it is likely that some of these benefits did not go to the 
true victims for a host of reasons, but $33 billion in benefits should not 
be dismissed or even partially discounted on the basis of opinion, specu-
lation, hypotheticals, or allegations. 
III. CONCLUSION 
No less august a body than the United States Supreme Court in 
Twombly declared that defendants in antitrust cases sometimes settle 
meritless cases.185 Yet the Court relied not on evidence, not on a survey 
or study, but rather on the unsupported opinion of another appellate court 
judge.186 Based on little more than conjecture, the Court made it more 
difficult for all complaints to survive a motion to dismiss. 
This Article is not a responsive cost-benefit analysis of private anti-
trust enforcement. But it does demonstrate more than $30 billion of its 
benefits, which resulted from sixty cases that appear on the whole to 
have had significant merit. By contrast, critics have not systematically 
shown any significant costs, relying instead on more anecdotes or unsup-
ported assertions. We know of no study providing evidence that any sig-
nificant number of cases lacked merit and yet recovered substantial set-
tlements. 
                     
 185. See Questionable Innovation, supra note 50, at 370. 
 186. Id. Note that the Supreme Court ignored a trial court judge offering a conflicting opinion. 
Id. 
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Moreover, as a result of our decision only to count cash recoveries, 
the information collected in this study provides only a substantial under-
statement of the benefits that private actions have achieved. This study 
thus most emphatically does not provide a sense of the most favorable 
results that private actions may have achieved, or even any notion of how 
much they probably have achieved or how often or typically they have 
achieved these results. It is a floor, but definitely not a ceiling, on the 
benefits of private enforcement. 
These findings are enough to create a presumption that private en-
forcement is in the public interest. Indeed, modern antitrust is in large 
part a battle over presumptions and burdens of proof. In light of our re-
sults, the burden should now shift to the critics. Critics of private anti-
trust enforcement should now be required to provide some similarly 
credible systematic evidence to substantiate their positions. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Formal Names and Citations to the Twenty New Cases that 
this Study Analyzed 
1. Meijer, Inc. v. 3M, C.A. No. 04-5871 (E.D. Pa. Aug 14, 2006) 
(“3M”). 
2. In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litig., MD 06-
1775JGVVP, 2008 WL 5958061 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2008), re-
port and recommendation adopted in part, 06-MD-
1775(JG)(VVP), 2009 WL 3443405 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2009) 
(“Air Cargo”). 
3. Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., No. 08-2784 et al., 12 (3rd Cir. 
Dec. 21, 2011) (en banc). Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 
F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1876, 182 l. Ed. 
2d 646 (U.S. 2012), reh’g denied 132 S.Ct. 2451 (U.S. 2012) 
(“DeBeers”). 
4. In re Elec. Carbon Products Antitrust Litig., 622 F. Supp. 2d 144 
(D.N.J. 2007) (“Electrical Carbon Fiber”). 
5. In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust 
Litig., 681 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D. Conn. 2009) (“EPDM”). 
6. In re High Pressure Laminates Antitrust Litig., 00 MDL 1368 
(CLB), 2006 WL 931692 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2006) (“High Pres-
sure Laminates”). 
7. In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., MDL 05-1717-
JJF, 2005 WL 1838069 (D. Del. 2007) (“Intel”). 
8. In re Polyester Staple Antitrust Litig., C.A. No. 3:03-1516 
(W.D.N.C. July 19, 2007) (“Polyester Staple”). 
9.  Molecular Diagnostics Laboratories v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 
402 F. Supp. 2d 276 (D.D.C. 2005) (“MDL v. Hoffman”). 
10. In re Methionine Antitrust Litig., 204 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Cal. 
2001) (“Methionine”). 
11. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22521 (D. Minn. Sept. 13, 2000); In re Monosodium 
Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 229 (D. Minn. 2001) 
(“MSG”). 
12. In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369 
(D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2002) (“Mylan”). 
13. Novell v. Microsoft (complaint not filed). 
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14. Ortho Biotech Products, L.P. v. Amgen Inc., CIV. 05-4850 
(SRC), 2006 WL 3392939 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2006) (“Ortho Bio-
tech”). 
15. In re OSB Antitrust Litig., 06-826. 2007 WL 2253419 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 3, 2007) (“OSB”). 
16. In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., C.A. No. 01:02-0844 (N.D. 
Ohio 2002) (“Scrap Metal”). 
17. Deloach v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., No. 1:00CV01234, 
2004 WL 5508762 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2005) (“Tobacco”). 
18. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 580 F. 
Supp. 2d 345 (D. Del. 2008) (“Tricor”). 
19. United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), modified, 183 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001), aff’d, 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003), aff’d, 344 F.3d 229 
(2d Cir. 2003), enforced, 98 CIV. 7076 (BSJ), 2007 WL 
1741885 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2007) (“Visa MC”). 
20. In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516 (3d Cir. 
2004) (“Warfarin”). 
Table A2: Summary of Kinds of Validation in Cases in Original Sample 
of Forty Cases 
Kind of Validation of Merits Number of Cases 
Criminal Penalty 13 out of 40 (32.5%) 
Government Obtained Civil Relief 12 out of 40 (30%) 
Ds Lost Trial in Same or 
Related Case 9 out of 40 (22.5%) 
Ps Survived or Prevailed at 
Summary Judgment 9 out of 40 (22.5%) 
Ps Survived Motion to 
Dismiss 3 out 40 (7.5%) 
At Least One Basis for 
Validation 34 out of 40 (85%) 
At Least One Basis for 
Validation, not including surviving 
motion to dismiss 
33 out of 40 (82.5%) 
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Table A3: Summary of Validation of Merits in Individual Cases for the 
Twenty Newly Analyzed Cases 
Case Validation of Merits 
3M Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss, 
Ds Lost Trial in Same or Related Case, 
Class Certification for Litigation 
Air Cargo Criminal Penalty, 
Surviving Motion to Dismiss 





Class Certification for Litigation, 
Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss 
EPDM  Class Certification for Litigation, 




Class Certification for Litigation, Plaintiffs Sur-
vived Summary Judgment and Judgment as a Mat-
ter of Law 




Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss 
Methionine Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss, 
Class Certification for Litigation 
MSG Ps Survived or Prevailed at Summary Judgment, 
Class Certified for Litigation, 




Ds Lost Trial in Same or Related Case, 
Government Obtained Civil Relief 
Novell v.  
Microsoft 





OSB Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss, 
Class Certification for Litigation 




Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss, 
Class Certification for Litigation 
Scrap Metal Criminal Penalty, 
Ds Lost Trial in Same or Related Case, 
Class Certification for Litigation, 
Ps Survived or Prevailed at Summary Judgment 
Tobacco Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss, 
Class Certification for Litigation 
Tricor  Government Obtained Civil Relief, 
Class Certification for Litigation, 
Ps Survived or Prevailed at Summary Judgment, 
Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss 
Visa MC Government Obtained Civil Relief, 
Ds Lost Trial in Same or Related Case 
Warfarin Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss, 
Class Certification for Litigation 
Table A4: “Pure” Recoveries from Foreign Cartels and Monopolies 
Case Recovery ($s Millions) 
Air Cargo 273 
De Beers 295 
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Table A5: Recoveries from Foreign Cartels and Monopolies Which 
Cannot Be Separated from Domestic Companies’ Recoveries187 
Case Recovery ($s Millions) 
EPDM 107 
Methionine 107 





Table A6: Un-weighted Average Attorney’s Fee Percentage 
 
Case ($ millions in the recovery) Attorney’s Fee 
Percentage 
Airline Ticket Commission (86) 33.3 
Augmentin (91) 21.6188 
NCAA (74) 26.8 
Remeron (75) 33.3 
Platinol (50) 33.3 
Remeron (75) 33.3 
Taxol (66) 30 
Drill Bits (53) 30.8 
Polypropylene Carpet (50) 33.3 
Sorbates (96) 27.5189 
Terazosin (74) 33.3 
Microcrystalline Cellulose (50) 33.3 
Specialty Steel (50) 30 
Lysine (65) 7 
Commercial Explosives (77) 15 
Automative Refinishing Paint (106) 32.65190 
Buspirone (220) 33.3 
Cardizem (110) 30 
DRAM (326) 25 
Flat Glass (122) 32 
                     
 187. The cases listed in Table A5 involve settlements with multiple defendants in which either 
the defendants are grouped together with both foreign companies and domestic, making it impossible 
to tell which part of the recovery comes from the foreign company, or the defendants are subsidiaries 
of foreign companies operating in the United States. 
 188. Weighted average of direct (20%) and indirect (25%). 
 189. Average of 22%–33%. 
 190. Average of 32%–33.3%. 
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Linerboard (202) 30 
Oil Lease (193) 25 
Paxil (165) 25191 
Relafen (250) 33 
Visa/MasterCard (3,383) 6.5 
Auction Houses (552) 5.2192 
El Paso (1,427) 6 
Fructose (531) 25 
NASDAQ (1,027) 13 
Total: 9646 Average : 25.64% 
Table A7: Weighted Average Attorney’s Fee Percentage 






Airline Ticket Commission 
(86) 
33.3 2863.8 
Augmentin (91) 21.6194 1956.6 
NCAA (74) 26.8 1983.2 
Remeron (75) 33.3 2497.5 
Platinol (50) 33.3 1665 
Remeron (75) 33.3 2497.5 
Taxol (66) 30 1980 
Drill Bits (53) 30.8 1632.4 
Polypropylene Carpet (50) 33.3 1665 
Sorbates (96) 27.5195 2640 




Specialty Steel (50) 30 1500 
Lysine (65) 7 455 




                     
 191. Average of 20% and 30%. 
 192. Plaintiffs’ attorneys received 20% of their fee in coupons—the same percentage that class 
members got of their recovery in coupons. 
 193. Case award total multiplied by Attorney’s Fee Percentage yields the Weighted Value. 
 194. Weighted average of direct (20%) and indirect (25%). 
 195. Average of 22%–33%. 
 196. Average of 32%–33.3%. 
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Buspirone (220) 33.3 7326 
Cardizem (110) 30 3300 
DRAM (326) 25 8150 
Flat Glass (122) 32 3904 
Linerboard (202) 30 6060 
Oil Lease (193) 25 4825 
Paxil (165) 25197 4125 
Relafen (250) 33 8250 
Visa/MasterCard (3,383) 6.5 21989.5 
Auction Houses (552) 5.2198 2870.4 
El Paso (1,427) 6 8562 
Fructose (531) 25 13275 
NASDAQ (1,027) 13 13351 
Total: 9646 Weighted Average: 14.31%199 
Table A8: Present Value (in 2011 dollars) of the Recoveries in the Forty 
Previously Studied Private Cases 





2011 $s  
(millions) 
(CPI) 
1 Airline Ticket  
Commission Litigation 
1997 86.1 121.71 
2 Auction Houses 2000/ 
2003200 
412/40  542.85/49.32 
3 Ryan-House 2004 91.5 109.9 
4 Automotive  
Refinishing Paint 
2007 105.75 115.72 
5 Buspirone 2003 220 271.28 
6 Caldera, Inc.  
v. Microsoft Corp. 
2000 275 362.34 
7 Cardizem CD 2004 110 132.12 
                     
 197. Average of 20% and 30%. 
 198. Plaintiffs’ attorneys received 20% of their fee in coupons—the same percentage that class 
members got of their recovery in coupons. 
 199. Weighted Value Total (138078) divided by Case Award Total (9646) equals Weighted 
Average (14.31%). 
 200. Auction Houses included two classes which recovered in different years, a Domestic Class 
(2000) and a Foreign Class (2003). 
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8 Citric Acid 1997 86.2 121.86 
9 Commercial Explosives 1998 113 157.29 
10 Conwood Co.  
v. U.S. Tobacco, Co. 
2000 or 
2002201 
1050 1383.57 or 
1324.25 
11 Dynamic Random  
Access Memory 
2007 326 356.73 




13 Flat Glass 2005 121.7 141.38 
14 Fructose 2004 531 637.79 
15 Graphite Electrodes 2003 47 57.96 
16 IBM v. Microsoft 2005 775 900.35 
17 Insurance 1995 36 53.6 
18 Linerboard 2004 202.5 243.22 
19 Amino Acid Lysine 1996/1997 45/5/15/15203 65.07/7.07/ 
21.2/21.2 
20 Microcystalline  
Cellulose 
2005/2003 25/25 29.04/ 
30.83204 
21 NASDAQ  
Market-Makers 
1998 1027 1429.54 
22 Law v. NCAA 2000 74.5 98.16 
23 North Shore  
Hematology & Oncology 
2004 50 60.06 
24 Lease Oil 1999 193.5 263.52 
25 Netscape Comm.  
Corp. v. Microsoft 
2003 750 924.82 
26 Oncology & Radiation 
Associates 
2003 65.8 81.14 
                     
 201. Conwood Co. had the trial in 2000, then an appeal and trebling in 2002, so we calculated 
both. 
 202. Natural Gas Antitrust Cases included $551 million in cash and stock and $876 in semi-
annual cash. 
 203. Amino Acid Lysine had a class for major defendants (1996), a separate case for two de-
fendants (1997), and then estimates for state opt-out plaintiffs and federal class opt-out payments 
($15 million each). See Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6 at tbl. 14. The $15 million estimates 
are calculated based on 1997 dollars. 
 204. It was uncertain if these were two different recoveries, so both are included in the total. 
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27 Stop N Shop  
Supermarket Co. 
2005 165 191.69 
28 Polyproylene Carpet 2001 49.7 63.67 
29 RealNetworks, Inc. v. 
Microsoft 
2005 478 - 761 555.31 – 
884.09 
30 Red Eagle Resources 1993/ 
1994205 
45.4/8 71.29/12.25 
31 Relafen 2004/ 
2005206 
175/75 210.19/87.13 
32 Remeron 2005 75 87.13 
33 Rubber Chemicals 2005/ 
2006207 
250.4/18.5 290.9/20.82 
34 Sorbates Direct Purchaser 2002 96.5 121.71 
35 Sun Microsystems v. Mi-
crosoft 
2004 700 840.77 
36 Terazosin Hydrochloride 2002 74.5 93.96 
37 Transamerican Refining 
Corp 
1992 50 80.86 
38 Urethane 2006 73.3 82.49 
39 Visa Check/ 
MasterMoney 
2003 3383 4171.55 









                     
 205. Red Eagle Resources has two recovery amounts given and no explanation; they are added 
together in the total. 
 206. Relafen has an Direct class (2004) and an Indirect Class (2005). 
 207. Rubber Chemicals has recovery amounts for Bayer (2005) and Flexsys (2006). 
 208. Vitamins provided a conservative average of settlement dates. 
 209. The total is calculated first using all the lowest possible numbers where a range is given, 
then using the higher numbers. 
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Table A9: Recoveries for the Twenty Newly Studied Cases with a  
Criminal Penalty as Well 
Case Recovery ($ millions) 
AirCargo 278 
De Beers 295 
Electrical Carbon Fiber 30 
Polyester Staple 61 




Table A10: Recoveries in the Twenty Newly Studied Cases Validated by 
Government Action 
Case Validation of Merits in Government Action 
Recovery  
($ millions) 
AirCargo Guilty Pleas 278 
De Beers Guilty Plea 295 
Electrical Carbon  
Fiber 
Guilty Pleas 30 
Intel Settlement with FTC, 
EU Fine 
1250 
Mylan Settlement with FTC 70 
Novell v. Microsoft EU Fine and Injunctive 
Relief 
536 
Polyester Staple Guilty Pleas, Fines 61 
Scrap Metal Conviction, Guilty 
Pleas, Fines 
34.5 
Tricor Settlement with State 
Attorneys General 
316 
Visa MC DOJ won at trial  
and on appeal 
6813 
   
Total  9684 
1328 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1269 
Table A11: Judges Presiding Over Twenty Newly Studied Private Cases 
by Appointing President210 
Judge Case Nominated By Political Party 
John 
Padova 
3M Bush Republican 
Gleeson Air Cargo Clinton Democrat 
Chesler De Beers Bush Republican 
Simandle Electrical  Carbon Fiber Bush Republican 
Dorsey/ 
Underhill 




Brieant High Pressure Laminates Nixon Republican 




Hoffman Clinton Democrat 
Breyer Methionine Clinton Democrat 






Chesler Ortho Biotech Bush Republican 
Diamond OSB Bush Republican 
Voorhees Polyester Sta-ple Reagan Republican  
Nugent Scrap Metal Clinton Democrat 
Osteen Tobacco Bush Republican 
Robinson Tricor  Bush Republican 
Jones Visa MC Clinton Democrat 
Robinson Warfarin  Bush Republican 






                     
 210. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/ 
history/home.nsf (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
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Table A12: Summary of Kinds of Validation in Twenty  
Newly Studied Cases 
Kind of Validation of Merits Number of Cases 
Criminal Penalty 5 out of 20 (25%) 
Government Obtained Civil Relief 5 out of 20 (25%) 
Ds Lost Trial in Same or Related Case 4 out of 20 (20%) 
Ps Survived or Prevailed at Summary Judg-
ment or Judgment as a Matter of Law 5 out of 20 (25%) 
Ps Survived Motion to Dismiss 11 out of 20 (55%) 
Class Certification for Litigation 11 out of 20 (55%) 
At Least One Basis for Validation 19 out of 20 (95%) 
At Least One Basis for Validation, Not In-
cluding Surviving Motion to Dismiss or 
Certification of Litigation Class 
14 out of 20 (70%) 
 













                     
 211. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1990–1999 12, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/246419.pdf [hereinafter 1990–1999 WORKLOAD]; 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2000–2009 13, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/281484.pdf [hereinafter 2000–2009 WORKLOAD]; U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2002–2011 11, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workload-statistics.pdf [hereinafter 2002–2011 WORKLOAD]. 
































                     
 212. 1990–1999 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 12; 2000–2009 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, 
at 13; 2002–2011 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 11. 
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 213. See 1990–1999 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 12; 2000–2009 WORKLOAD, supra note 
211, at 13; 2002–2011 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 12. 
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Table A16: Total Incarceration 1990–2011214 
Year 
Incarceration: Number of Days of 
Prison Time Sentenced in Anti-

























196,937 ÷ 365.25 = 539.18 years
 
                     
 214. 1990–1999 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 13; 2000–2009 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, 
at 14; 2002–2011 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 12. 
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Table A17: Total of Non-Prison Confinement Days (e.g., House Arrest) 
1990–2011215 
Year 
Number of Other Confinement 
























Total 42,986 42986 ÷ 365.25 = 117.69 years 
 
                     
 215. 1990–1999 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 13; 2000–2009 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, 
at 14; 2002–2011 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 12. 
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1 1990 31,079 53,488 
2 1991 29,176 48,185 
3 1992 29,805 46,631 
4 1993 46,981 73,134 
5 1994 46,936 71,240 
6 1995 45,055 66,500 
7 1996 30,760 44,099 
8 1997 207,947 291,435 
9 1998 253,392 349,679 
10 1999 999,028 1,348,862 
11 2000 320,494 418,650 
12 2001 307,918 391,094 
13 2002 127,159 158,994 
14 2003 80,707 98,664 
15 2004 161,244 192,007 
16 2005 619,786 713,846 
17 2006 482,920 538,827 
18 2007 665,788 722,293 
19 2008 704,723 736,263 
20 2009 992,615 1,040,743 
21 2010 376,035 387,905 
22 2011 390,975 390,978 
Totals 6,949,803 8,183,517 
 
 
                     
 216. All data taken from Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, Table 15, and updated by 
2002–2011 WORKLOAD, supra note 211, at 11. These figures represent the combined totals of corpo-
rate antitrust fines, individual antitrust fines, and restitution from 1990–2007. The individual anti-
trust fines were tripled. For explanation, see Comparative Deterrence, supra note 6, at Section IV. 
 217. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_cal 
culator.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
